LandRightsNFarming: 11 issues, court document, ready for use by ;Rodney Dale; [Class]

IN THE COURT OF

__________________________

Petitioner CASE#_________________

Vs JUDGE________________

______________________________

FICTITIOUS PLAINTIFF

RECONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE AND NEW INFORMATION

JUDICIAL NOTICE; NOTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT,

ALL COURTS ARE OPERATING UNDER

(1) TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AS CODIFIED IN TITLE 50 USC,

(2) TITLE 28 USC, CHAPTER 176, FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE,

(3) FED.R.CIV.P. 4(j) UNDER TITLE 28 USC §1608, MAKING THE COURTS “FOREIGN STATES” TO THE PEOPLE BY CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE & IN VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & JUDICIAL PROCEDURES,

(4) VIOLATION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF PARTIES SERVING FOR PAY UNDER PRIVATE CONTRACT TO ‘WE THE PEOPLE’,

(5) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT & NOTICE OF FELONY

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

by: _______________________________agent

Third Party

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE

:* *63C Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, §247* “As expressed otherwise, the powers delegated to a public officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officer. [1] Furthermore, the view has been expressed that all public officers, within whatever branch

and whatever level of government, and whatever be their private vocations, are trustees of the people, and accordingly labor under every disability and prohibition imposed by law upon trustees relative to the making of personal financial gain from a discharge of their trusts. [2] That is, a public officer occupies a fiduciary relationship to the political entity on whose behalf he or she serves. [3] and owes a fiduciary duty to the public. [4] It has been said that the fiduciary responsibilities of a public officer cannot be less than those of a private individual. [5] Furthermore, it has been stated that any enterprise undertaken by the public official who tends to weaken public confidence and undermine the sense of security for individual rights is against public policy. Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit-and this is one of the meanings that fraud bears [483 U.S. 372] in the statute. See United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir1985) includes the deliberate concealment of material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the public, including, in the case of a judge, the litigants who appear before him and

if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud. McNally v United States 483 U.S. 350 (1987)

Texas Penal Code Sec. 1.07. DEFINITIONS. (a) In this code:

(9) "Coercion" means a threat, however communicated:

(A) to commit an offense;

(B) to inflict bodily injury in the future on the person threatened or another;

(D) to expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule;

(E) to harm the credit or business repute of any person; or

(F) to take or withhold action as a public servant, or to cause a public servant to take or withhold action.

(19) "Effective consent" includes consent by a person legally authorized to act for the owner. Consent is not effective if:

(A) induced by force, threat, or fraud;

(B) given by a person the actor knows is not legally authorized to act for the owner;

(C) given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect, or intoxication is known by the actor to be unable to make reasonable decisions; or

(D) given solely to detect the commission of an offense.

(24) "Government" means:

(A) the state;

(B) a county, municipality, or political subdivision of the state; or

(30) "Law" means the constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States, a written opinion of a court of record, a municipal ordinance, an order of a county commissioners court, or a rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.

(41) "Public servant" means a person elected, selected, appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as one of the following, even if he has not yet qualified for office or assumed his duties:

(A) an officer, employee, or agent of government;

(B) a juror or grand juror; or

(C) an arbitrator, referee, or other person who is authorized by law or private written agreement to hear or determine a cause or controversy; or

(D) an attorney at law or notary public when participating in the performance of a governmental function; or

(E) a candidate for nomination or election to public office; or

(F) a person who is performing a governmental function under a claim of right although he is not legally qualified to do so.

THE COUNTY OF, _____________________, INC.

THE STATE OF, _______________________, INC.

THE UNITED STATES, INC.

Re: Alphanumeric Code E.I.N. or T.I.N. OR CASE # -------------------------

RECONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE AND NEW INFORMATION

JUDICIAL NOTICE; NOTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT,

ALL COURTS ARE OPERATING UNDER

(1) TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT AS CODIFIED IN TITLE 50 USC,

(2) TITLE 28 USC, CHAPTER 176, FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE,

(4) VIOLATION OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION OF PARTIES SERVING FOR PAY UNDER PRIVATE CONTRACT TO ‘WE THE PEOPLE’,

(5) CRIMINAL COMPLAINT & NOTICE OF FELONY

"IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO DECLARE THE MEANING OF WHAT IS WRITTEN, AND NOT WHAT WAS INTENDED TO BE WRITTEN. J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 20 Wn.2d 337,348-49, 147 P.2d 310 (1944), cited with approval in Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wn2d at 669.

NOW, COMES _________________________Petitioner as of Right to challenge and set straight the jurisdiction of the Court on error of conviction / allegation by Plaintiff or Defendant, in violation of Constitutionally-Protected Rights, Due Process violation, Administrative Procedures violation, Judicial Procedures violation, Foreign State violation, violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act and violation of the Federal Debt Collection Procedure under 28 USC chapter 176.

People Pay For Honest Service

ISSUE ONE:

PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE UNDER CONTRACT AS PER

THE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTORY LAW

Those holding Public Office under the Constitution and Statutory Law have a WRITTEN contract with We The People. The contract clearly states there is compensation for the services. This compensation is for “Honest Service” as per WRITTEN contract / trust / charter, or whatever phrase that is used for the job position serving We The People. No one can hold such a position of trust without meeting the qualifications as found in the Statutes at Large; Oaths of Offices, and within the Constitution, Article VI clause 3: “The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or Public Trust under the United States.” In no place does the Constitution allow pay over and above the set compensation. Any other remuneration is dishonest service, and not part of the original WRITTEN contract with We The People.

The federal statutes also address pay allotment. Federal and State funding and grants give allotment to all public offices. When the people have provided compensation to the public officials and then are further charged for services which have already received compensation, and then fail to get remedy, this becomes Honest Services fraud upon the people. When public offices sell their position for credit standing while receiving compensation from the people, this constitutes Honest Services fraud. When public officials use their public position to aid any other agency or department in order to enhance their own revenue, this is fraud, and to receive federal or grant funding in addition to their pay violates Honest Service. Any public official that receives funding in addition to their own compensation under the Constitution would be deemed to have overthrown a Constitutional form of government. Below are listed the foundations of public office.

The Petitioner reminds the Court that Article III section 2 of the constitution addresses contract law. When the Eleventh Amendment was passed, not only was judicial power restricted, but the law of contract was similarly restricted and your offices now operate under common law / private contract to the people – commerce ‘condition to pay.’

Article I Section 6 clause 1

The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

Article II section 1 clause 7

The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall

not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Article III section 1 clause 1

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 55 > SUBCHAPTER I

§5507. Officer affidavit; condition to pay

An officer required by section 3332 of this title to file an affidavit may not be paid until the affidavit has been filed.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart B > CHAPTER 33 > SUBCHAPTER II
§3332. Officer affidavit; no consideration paid for appointment

An officer, within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, shall file with the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title an affidavit that neither he nor anyone acting in his behalf has given, transferred, promised, or paid any consideration for or in the expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing the appointment.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart B > CHAPTER 33 > SUBCHAPTER II

§3331. Oath of office

An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: “I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” This section does not affect other oaths required by law.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart B > CHAPTER 33 > SUBCHAPTER II

§3333. Employee affidavit; loyalty and striking against the Government

(a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, an individual who accepts office or employment in the Government of the United States or in the government of the District of Columbia shall execute an affidavit within 60 days after accepting the office or employment that his acceptance and holding of the office or employment does not or will not violate section 7311 of this title. The affidavit is prima facie evidence that the acceptance and holding of office or employment by the affiant does not or will not violate section 7311 of this title.

(b) An affidavit is not required from an individual employed by the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia for less than 60 days for sudden emergency work involving the loss of human life or the destruction of property. This subsection does not relieve an individual from liability for violation of section 7311 of this title.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart F > CHAPTER 73 > SUBCHAPTER II

§7311. Loyalty and striking

An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 93 >

§1918. Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the Government

Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he -

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts them right to strike against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63

§1346. Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud”

For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

TITLE 10 > Subtitle A > PART I > CHAPTER 15

§333. Interference with State and Federal law

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

EXAMPLE OF STATE FEES:

RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

CIVIL RULES

Rule 3.3. Court fees

(I) Fees

(A) Original Entries:

Civil Writ of Summons or Counterclaim (including set-off, recoupment, cross-claims and

            third-party claims)   $ 130.00
Replevin   $ 120.00
Landlord/Tenant entry   $ 100.00
Registration of Foreign Judgment   $ 150.00
Small Claims Entry and Counterclaim, $5000 or less (including set-off, recoupment,

cross-claims and third-party claims) $72.00
Small Claims Transfer Fee $ 108.00
Small Claims Entry and Counterclaim, $5001 to $7500 (including set-off, recoupment,

cross-claims and third-party claims) $ 127.00

(B) General and Miscellaneous

Motion for Periodic PaymentS   $ 25.00
Petition to annul criminal record   $ 100.00
Original writ   $ 1.00
Writ of Execution   $ 25.00
Petition for Ex Parte Attachment, or Writ of Trustee Process    $ 25.00
Reissued Orders of Notice   $ 25.00
Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice    $ 225.00

Exemplification of Judgment $ 25.00

Certified Copies $ 5.00
All copied material (except transcripts) $ .50/page

Computer Screen Printout $ .50/page

(II) Surcharge

Pursuant to RSA 490:26-a, II, the sum of $25.00 shall be added to each civil filing fee set forth in paragraph (I)(A) above, except for the following types of cases which pursuant to RSA 490:26-a, II(b) are exempt from the surcharge:

(III) Records Research Fees

(A) Records Research Fees. Record information must be requested in writing and include the individual's full name and, if available, the individual's date of birth. A fee of $20 per name will be assessed per name for up to 5 names. Additional names will be assessed $5 per name. Record information must be requested in writing and include the individual's full name and, if available, the individual's date of birth.

(B) The Clerk may waive the records research fee when a request for record information is made by a member of the media consistent with the public's right to access court records under the New Hampshire Constitution.

FEDERAL OFFICIALS

Table 1. Salaries of Federal Officials

Position Jan. 2003 Jan. 2004 Jan. 2005

Legislative Branch

Vice President of the United States (President of the Senate) $198,600 $203,000 $208,100

Speaker of the House of Representatives 198,600 203,000 208,100

President Pro Tempore of the Senate 171,900 175,700 180,100

Majority and Minority Leaders — House and Senate 171,900 175,700 180,100

Senators, Representatives, Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, and Delegates 154,700 158,100 162,100

Judicial Branch

Chief Justice of the United States $198,600 $203,000 $208,100

Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 190,100 194,300 199,200

Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeal 164,000 167,600 171,800

Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed

Services 164,000 167,600 171,800

Judges, U.S. District Courts 154,700 158,100 162,100

Judges, United States Court of Federal Claims 154,700 158,100 162,100

Judges, United States Court of International

Trade 154,700 158,100 162,100

Judges, Tax Court of the United States 154,700 158,100 162,100

Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans

Claims 154,700 158,100 162,100

Bankruptcy Judges 142,300 145,500 149,132

Magistrate Judges 142,300 145,500 149,132

Executive Branch

President of the United States a $400,000 $400,000 $400,000

Executive Schedule

Level I: Cabinet-level officials $171,900 $175,700 $180,100

Level II: Deputy secretaries of departments, secretaries of military departments, & heads of major agencies 154,700 158,100 162,100

Level III: Under secretaries of departments & heads of middle-level agencies 142,500 145,600 149,200

Level IV: Assistant secretaries & general counsels of departments, heads of minor agencies, members of certain boards & commissions 134,000 136,900 140,300

Level V: Administrators, commissioners, directors, & members of boards, commissions, or units of agencies 125,400 128,200 131,400

Clerk of Court

CLERK OF COURT: United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Manhattan, New York City, NY. Salary: $174,000 (2010).

CLERK OF COURT: United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California. Sacramento, CA. Salary: $142,783 - $174,000 (2010).

COURT CLERK 1: Second Judicial District Court. Washoe County, NV. Salary: $26,332 - $55,577 (2010).

CLERK OF COURT: United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Atlanta, GA. Salary: $156,734 - $162,900 (2009).

CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT II: North Dakota Court System. Fargo, ND. Salary: $4,678 monthly starting salary with an increase to $4,871 monthly upon successful completion of probationary period (2009).

CLERK OF COURT: United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California. Los Angeles, California. Salary: $167,258 - $174,000 (2009).

CLERK OF COURT: United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. New Orleans, LA. Salary: $150,533 - $163,389 (2009).

ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT: Office of Court Administration, Second Judicial District Court. Reno, Nevada. Salary: $71,614 - $103,854. (2009).

CLERK OF THE COURT: United States District and Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho. Boise, Idaho.

CASE INITIATION CLERK: Eleventh Circuit, United States Court of Appeals, Atlanta GA.. Salary: $35,161-$48,545. (2009)

CLERK OF COURT: U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 9th Circuit. Pasadena, CA. Salary: $105,566 - $137,242; $105,566 - $137,242. (2009)

DEPUTY COURT EXECUTIVE OFFICER 2: Bernalillo County Metropolitan Court, Administration Division, Human Resource Division. Albuquerque, NM. Salary: $59,290 - $74,112/annually DOE. (2009)

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT: New Jersey Judiciary. NJ. Salary: $104,010 - $137,821. (2009)

CLERK OF THE COURT: District Court of Oregon, Portland OR. Salary: $158,267 – 171,784. (2009)

CLERICAL ASSISTANT: Office of Attorney Ethics, Supreme Court of NJ, AOC. Ewing, NJ. Salary: $18.00/hour. (2009)

RECORDS CLERK: United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio; Cleveland, OH. Salary: $31,644 - $51,424. (2009)

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT II: North Dakota Court System; Fargo, ND. .. Salary: $4,678 monthly. (2009)

CLERK OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT: Eastern District of Wisconsin, U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Salary: $111,349 - $149,978. (2008)

CLERK OF COURT: U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Grand Rapids... Salary: $126,618 - $157,999 (2008)

CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT: Circuit Court, Eau Clair County, WI. TSalary: $59,172 - $60,651 (2008)

CLERK OF COURT: United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ.. Salary: $109,450 - $158,500 (2008)

CLERK OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT: United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI.. Salary: $111,349-$149,978. (2008)

CLERK OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT: State of Maine Judicial Branch, Portland, ME. Salary: $50,533-$65,818. (2007)

CLERK OF THE COURT II: Second District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake City, UT.. Salary: $20.06 – $24.92 per hour. (2007)

CLERK OF COURT: United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York.. Salary: $154,600 - $165,200 (2007)

STAFF ATTORNEY (Trial Court Law Clerk): Salary: $43,403.40 (2007)

DISTRICT COURT ADMINISTRATOR/CLERK OF THE COURT: Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, (work in Reno, Nevada) Salary: $80,122 - $124,218 (2007)

CLERK OF COURT III: Salida, CO... Salary: $3,494 - $4,683 / Month. (2007)

COUNTY CLERK: Whatcom County, Bellingham, WA. Salary: $67,500 - $93,168. (2006)

COURT EXECUTIVE OFFICER: Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento.. Salary: Commensurate with experience. (2006)

CLERK OF COURT: U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Alabama.. Salary: $138,685 - $150,664. (2006)

CLERK OF THE COURT: U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin. Salary: $141,422 - $153,637. (2006)

CLERK OF THE COURT IV: Anchorage, Alaska. rectly to the Presiding Judge. Perform other duties as assigned by the ACA or Presiding Judge. Salary: $5,162.00 monthly. (2006)

Chief Deputy Clerk of Court

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK: United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Atlanta, GA. Qualifications: Applicants must possess a minimum of six years of progressively responsible managerial or administrative experience, three of which must have involved extensive management responsibility, preferably in an appellate or federal court environment. Salary: $139,383 - $165,300 (2010).

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK (TYPE II): United States Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Washington. Seattle, WA. . Salary: $59,978 - $162,900 (2009).

CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK: Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas-St. John District. St. Thomas and St. Croix, Virgin Islands.. Salary: $62,085 - $101,733 (2010).

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT: Maricopa County, AZ.. Salary: $93,600 to $108,160 (2009).

Massachusetts Court

4.600 Classification and Wage Compensation Plan

A. The Plan

The Chief Justice for Administration and Management has established a system-wide position Classification and Wage Compensation Plan (Plan) in which positions have corresponding job descriptions and are evaluated and classified according to objective criteria using a weighted factor point methodology. This methodology allows for the evaluation of positions on the basis of such things as duties, responsibilities, and qualifications required for each position. Once evaluated, positions are then classified into compensation levels with corresponding salary ranges based upon the total of the weighted factor points. The Plan and its methodology are flexible and can respond to the operational needs of the Trial Court. Within this framework, positions and classification levels can be added or adjusted.

B. Responsibilities

Department heads are responsible for maintaining the correct classification of their employees at all times. Department heads are encouraged to contact the Human Resources Department before changing an employee's duties and responsibilities to see if an adjustment in position classification is appropriate. Following promotions, department heads are responsible for ensuring that the duties and responsibilities of the promoted employee are consistent with the employee's new position title and job description. The Human Resources Department has the ultimate responsibility for the administration of the Plan consistent with the policies established by the Chief Justice for Administration and Management. The procedures of this section may be subject to other requirements as set forth from time to time by the Chief Justice for Administration and Management.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 55 > SUBCHAPTER IV

§ 5531. Definitions

For the purpose of section 5533 of this title—

(1) “member” has the meaning given such term by section 101 (23) of title 37;

(2) “position” means a civilian office or position (including a temporary, part-time, or intermittent position), appointive or elective, in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States (including a Government corporation and a nonappropriated fund instrumentality under the jurisdiction of the armed forces) or in the government of the District of Columbia;

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 53 > SUBCHAPTER I

§ 5306. Pay fixed by administrative action

(A) employees in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States (except employees whose pay is disbursed by the Secretary of the Senate or the Chief Administrative Officer of the House of Representatives) and of the government of the District of Columbia, whose rates of pay are fixed by administrative action under law and are not otherwise adjusted under this subchapter;

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 53 > SUBCHAPTER I

§ 5307. Limitation on certain payments

1) Except as otherwise permitted by or under law, or as otherwise provided under subsection (d), no allowance, differential, bonus, award, or other similar cash payment under this title may be paid to an employee in a calendar year if, or to the extent that, when added to the total basic pay paid or payable to such employee for service performed in such calendar year as an employee in the executive branch (or as an employee outside the executive branch to whom chapter 51 applies), such payment would cause the total to exceed the annual rate of basic pay payable for level I of the Executive Schedule, as of the end of such calendar year.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 53 > SUBCHAPTER VII

§ 5372. Administrative law judges

(A) There shall be 3 levels of basic pay for administrative law judges (designated as AL–1, 2, and 3, respectively), and each such judge shall be paid at 1 of those levels, in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(2) The Office of Personnel Management shall determine, in accordance with procedures which the Office shall by regulation prescribe, the level in which each administrative-law-judge position shall be placed and the qualifications to be required for appointment to each level.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 53 > SUBCHAPTER VII

§ 5374. Miscellaneous positions in the executive branch

The head of the agency concerned shall fix the annual rate of basic pay for each position in the executive branch specifically referred to in, or covered by, a conforming change in statute made by section 305 of the Government Employees Salary Reform Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 422), or other position in the executive branch for which the annual pay is fixed at a rate of $18,500 or more under special provision of statute enacted before August 14, 1964, which is not placed in a level of the Executive Schedule set forth in subchapter II of this chapter, at a rate equal to the pay rate of a grade and step of the General Schedule set forth in section 5332 of this title. The head of the agency concerned shall report each action taken under this section to the Office of Personnel Management and publish a notice thereof in the Federal Register, except when the President determines that the report and publication would be contrary to the interest of national security.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 55 > SUBCHAPTER IV

§ 5533. Dual pay from more than one position; limitations; exceptions

(a) Except as provided by subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, an individual is not entitled to receive basic pay from more than one position for more than an aggregate of 40 hours of work in one calendar week (Sunday through Saturday).

(b) Except as otherwise provided by subsection (c) of this section, the Office of Personnel Management, subject to the supervision and control of the President, may prescribe regulations under which exceptions may be made to the restrictions in subsection (a) of this section when appropriate authority determines that the exceptions are warranted because personal services otherwise cannot be readily obtained.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 55 > SUBCHAPTER IV

§ 5536. Extra pay for extra services prohibited

An employee or a member of a uniformed service whose pay or allowance is fixed by statute or regulation may not receive additional pay or allowance for the disbursement of public money or for any other service or duty, unless specifically authorized by law and the appropriation therefor specifically states that it is for the additional pay or allowance.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart D > CHAPTER 55 > SUBCHAPTER IV

§ 5535. Extra pay for details prohibited

(a) An officer may not receive pay in addition to the pay for his regular office for performing the duties of a vacant office as authorized by sections 3345–3347 of this title.

(b) An employee may not receive—

(1) additional pay or allowances for performing the duties of another employee; or

(2) pay in addition to the regular pay received for employment held before his appointment or designation as acting for or instead of an occupant of another position or employment.

This subsection does not prevent a regular and permanent appointment by promotion from a lower to a higher grade of employment.

TITLE 28 > PART I > CHAPTER 21

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge

(a)Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

(3) “fiduciary” includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, and guardian;

(4) “financial interest” means ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:

(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities is not a “financial interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund;

U.S. Department of Justice FY 2010 Budget Request

PRISONS AND DETENTION

+ $386 million in Enhancements

FY 2010 Overview

The FY 2010 Budget provides $6.1 billion for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and $1.4 billion for the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT) to ensure that sentenced criminals and detainees are housed in facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure. The budget includes $386 million in program increases for BOP and OFDT.

As a result of successful law enforcement policies targeting terrorism, immigration offenses, violent crime, drug crime, and other major crimes, the number of criminal suspects appearing in federal court continues to grow at a rapid pace, as does the number of individuals ordered detained and ultimately incarcerated. BOP and OFDT have limited flexibility in how they perform these important tasks as their activities are primarily governed by statue. BOP and OFDT continue to protect society by confining offenders in the controlled the environments of prisons and contract- or community-based facilities. BOP also provides work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens and reduce the likelihood of recidivism.

The FY 2010 Budget provides funding for an average daily detention population of nearly 61,000, increases detention bed space in the Southwest Border region, and provides for prisoner transportation and medical costs. The BOP operates 114 federal prisons and contracts for low security prison beds to confine approximately 205,000 inmates in FY 2009. BOP projects that the federal prison population will increase by approximately 4,500 in FY 2010. Therefore, the FY 2010 budget also expands federal prison capacity by funding the build-out and activation of two new medium security prisons (over 2,400 prison beds). It also provides for medical care and other operational increases, contract bed space, and over 1,000 additional correctional workers to help manage the larger inmate population.

Bureau of Prisons (BOP): $243 million

The BOP ensures that sentenced criminals are removed from society and housed in prisons and community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure. An appropriately trained and equipped staff is one of the primary means of accomplishing this task.

• Activation of FCI Mendota, CA (1,152 Beds) and FCI McDowell, WV (1,280 Beds): $102.1 million and 737 positions (350 correctional officers) to begin the process of equipping and staffing newly constructed prisons. When fully operational, these medium security facilities will house approximately 2,400 inmates. This enhancement funds constructive program opportunities for federal offenders, promoting an atmosphere conducive to positive change while they are incarcerated and better transition upon release. There are no current services for this initiative.

• BOP Staffing Increase: $70.6 million for increased BOP correctional officer staffing to effectively manage the growing inmate population at BOP institutions. BOP adheres to core values, which include correctional excellence. BOP staff are correctional workers first, and committed to the highest level of performance. However, operating the crowded Federal Prison System without commensurate personnel increases has placed severe demands on existing staff. Currently, 88 percent of the authorized correctional officer positions are filled. Insufficient staffing levels can seriously compromise the security of our federal prisons, endangering life and property. Current services for all of BOP staffing funded by the Salaries and Expenses appropriation is $3.6 billion.

• New and Existing Contract Beds: $53.4 million to procure 1,000 new contract beds ($27 million) and to pay for inflationary increases built into existing contracts ($26.4 million). The FY 2010 request provides full year funding for the 1,000 contract beds. Current services for contract beds is $798 million.

• Medical Increases: $16.7 million to pay for inflationary increases in medical costs ($16.7 million) needed to operate 115 federal institutions that are expected to house 171,524 offenders in FY 2010. On average in FY 2009, BOP will expend more than $2,700 per inmate annually for medical costs. (Note that the funding for medical costs for the inmates that will be housed in the two prisons that will be activated in FY 2010 is included in the $102.1 million

Office of Federal Detention Trustee (OFDT): $143.2 million

OFDT is responsible for providing secure detention space to individuals who have been arrested and await final disposition of their cases.

• Detainee Housing, Medical and Transportation: $98.6 million is provided in the budget to ensure that OFDT is able to pay for the housing, medical, and transportation costs for its detainee population. Recently, contract confinement costs have been increasing at a considerable rate. In addition, in many areas of the country, bed space is scarce, which has resulted in premium prices for existing beds. Consequently, OFDT is forced to pay an expensive premium in order to retain the beds for anticipated growth. The FY 2010 President’s Budget will support the anticipated average daily detainee population of 60,575. Current service resources are $928.7 million.

• Southwest Border and Immigration Enforcement: $44.6 million is provided for costs associated with prisoner detention and care for Southwest Border prosecutorial initiatives. This includes $371,000 to support increased human capital needs for office operations. This program increase is to accommodate the increased housing requirement for criminal aliens apprehended along the southwest border and prosecuted in U.S. district courts during FY 2010. It will support detention housing for 7,000 offenders apprehended by DHS and processed by USMS. Current services for this initiative is 366.7 million.

New Investment Summary (Amount in $000)

Bureau/Initiative	Positions	Correction Officers	Amount
Bureau of Prisons	737	350	$242,757
Activation of FCI Mendota, CA (1,152 beds) (2/2010) and FCI McDowell, WV (1,280 beds) (11/2009)	737	350	$102,120
BOP Staffing Increase	$70,568
Contract Beds and Contract Bed Wage and Price Increase	$53,384
Medical Increases	$16,685
Office of Federal Detention Trustee	4	$143,227
Detainee Housing, Medical, and Transportation	$98,648
Southwest Border and Immigration Enforcement	4	$44,579
Grand Total, New Investments	741	350	$385,984

Crimes and Criminal Procedure – 18 USC Sec. 4121. Federal Prison Industries; board of directors

"Federal Prison Industries", a government corporation of the District of Columbia, shall be administered by a board of six directors, appointed by the President to serve at the will of the
President without compensation.

Crimes and Criminal Procedure - 18 USC Sec. 4122. Administration of Federal Prison Industries

(a) Federal Prison Industries shall determine in what manner and to what extent industrial operations shall be carried on in Federal penal and correctional institutions for the production of commodities for consumption in such institutions or for sale to the departments or agencies of the United States, but not for sale to the public in competition with private enterprise.

TITLE 18 > PART III > CHAPTER 307

§4127 Prison Industries report to Congress

The board of directors of Federal Prison Industries shall submit an annual report to the Congress on the conduct of the business of the corporation during each fiscal year, and on the condition of its funds during such fiscal year. Such report shall include a statement of the amount of obligations issued under section 4129 (a)(1) during such fiscal year, and an estimate of the amount of obligations that will be so issued in the following fiscal year.

Federal Prison Industries

Summary

UNICOR, the trade name for Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (FPI), is a government-owned corporation that employs offenders incarcerated in correctional facilities under the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). UNICOR manufactures products and provides services that are sold to executive agencies in the federal government. FPI was created to serve as a means for managing, training, and rehabilitating inmates in the federal prison system through employment in one of its

industries. The question of whether UNICOR is unfairly competing with private businesses, particularly small businesses, in the federal market has been and continues to be an issue of debate. The debate has been affected by tensions between competing interests that represent two social goods — the employment and rehabilitation of offenders and the need to protect jobs of law abiding citizens. At the core of the debate is UNICOR’s preferential treatment over the private sector. UNICOR’s enabling legislation and the Federal Acquisition Regulation require

federal agencies, with the exception of the Department of Defense (DOD), to procure products offered by UNICOR, unless authorized by UNICOR to solicit bids from the private sector. While federal agencies are not required to procure services provided by UNICOR they are encouraged to do so. It is this “mandatory source clause” that has drawn controversy over the years and is the subject of current legislation. Of the eligible inmates held in federal prisons, 19,720 or 18% are employed by UNICOR. By statute, UNICOR must be economically self-sustaining, thus it does

not receive funding through congressional appropriations. In FY2005, FPI generated $765 million in sales. UNICOR uses the revenue it generates to purchase raw material and equipment; pay wages to inmates and staff; and invest in expansion of its facilities. Of the revenues generated by FPI’s products and services, approximately 74% go toward the purchase of raw material and equipment; 20% go toward staff salaries; and 6% go toward inmate salaries.

In recent years, the Administration has made several efforts to mitigate the competitive advantage UNICOR has over the private sector. Going beyond the Administration’s efforts, Congress has taken legislative action to lessen the adverse impact FPI has caused on small businesses. For example, in 2002, 2003, and 2004, Congress passed legislation that modified FPI’s mandatory source clause with respect to procurements made by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); in 2004, Congress passed legislation limiting funds appropriated for FY2004 to be used by federal agencies for the purchase of products or services

manufactured by FPI under certain circumstances. Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress would address many of the same issues as legislation in the 109th Congress. Like legislation in the 109th Congress, legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, S. 1407, S. 1547, and S. 1548, would eliminate the requirement that some or all executive agencies purchase products or services from FPI in most cases. This report will be updated as warranted.

As the federal prison system was established in the first decade of the 20th century, factories were constructed within the prisons to manufacture products needed by the federal government. Labor organizations had been making arguments against prison industries since the late 1800s due to the poor conditions in which inmates were working and their perception that the industries were taking jobs away from law abiding citizens. The Depression of the 1930s and the resulting high levels of unemployment crystalized the debate. UNICOR was established in 1934 under

an executive order issued by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.9 The purpose of UNICOR was to consolidate the operations of all federal prison industries in order to provide training opportunities for inmates and “diversify the production of prison shops so that no individual industry would be substantially affected.”

UNICOR is economically self-sustaining and does not receive funding through congressional appropriations. In FY2006, FPI generated $718 million in sales.17 UNICOR uses the revenue it generates to purchase raw material and equipment; pay wages to inmates and staff; and invest in expansion of its facilities. Of the revenues generated by FPI’s products and services, approximately 77% go toward the purchase of raw material and equipment; 18% go toward staff salaries; and 5% go toward inmate salaries. Inmates earn from $0.23 per hour up to a maximum of $1.15 per hour, depending on their proficiency and educational level, among other things.

Under BOP’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, all inmates who have court ordered financial obligations must use at least 50% of their FPI income to satisfy those debts, which accounted for $2.7 million in FY2005; the rest may be retained by the inmate.

28 CFR 42.201

TITLE 28--JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

PART 42--NONDISCRIMINATION; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY;
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Subpart D--Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs--
Implementation of Section 815(c)(1) of the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979

[[Page 695]]

815(c) of the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 (42 U.S.C. 3789d(c); title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d; and title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq., to the end that no person in any State shall on the ground of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be subjected to discrimination under, or be denied employment in connection with any program or activity funded in whole or in part with funds made available under either the Justice System Improvement Act or the Juvenile Justice Act by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the National Institute of Justice, or the Bureau of Justice Statistics. These regulations also implement Executive Order 12138, which requires all Federal agencies
awarding financial assistance to take certain steps to advance women's business enterprise.

ISSUE TWO:

CURE FOR CONTRACTUAL VIOLATION

The Petitioner sets forth the cure for contractual violation against the party that made the contract with the people and that hold such public office as found under the UNITED STATES Constitution Fourteenth Amendment, section 3. Section 4 allows for the collection of public debt under bounty.

Section 4: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.”

The Petitioner sets forth such a bounty in the amount of $150 million dollars plus any amount of public debt accrued by the private party(s) in such a contractual agreement at such agreed time and place to settle the matter of the ‘condition to pay’ clause in order to hold such public office under section 3 of the 14th amendment. Such public debt shall then be paid to the Petitioner upon the conclusion of such agreement by the party(s) at the time and place specified. If no such agreement can be reached and an error was made by said parties, the Petitioner will then instead claim a $1500 dollar sweat equity fee for appearance and $250 per hour or any part of an hour spent thereafter.

ISSUE THREE:
OATH OF OFFICE MAKES

PUBLIC OFFICIALS “FOREIGN”

Those holding Federal or State public office, county or municipal office, under the Legislative, Executive or Judicial branch, including Court Officials, Judges, Prosecutors, Law Enforcement Department employees, Officers of the Court, and etc., before entering into these public offices, are required by the U.S. Constitution and statutory law to comply with Title 5 USC, Sec. §3331, “Oath of office.” State Officials are also required to meet this same obligation, according to State Constitutions and State statutory law.

All oaths of office come under 22 CFR, Foreign Relations, Sections §§92.12 - 92.30, and all who hold public office come under Title 8 USC, Section §1481 “Loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizen; voluntary action; burden of proof; presumptions.”

Under Title 22 USC, Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Section §611, a Public Official is considered a foreign agent. In order to hold public office, the candidate must file a true and complete registration statement with the State Attorney General as a foreign principle.

The Oath of Office requires the public official in his / her foreign state capacity to uphold the constitutional form of government or face consequences.

Title 10 USC, Sec. §333, “Interference with State and Federal law”

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

Such willful action, while serving in official capacity, violates Title 18 USC, Section §1918:

Title 18 USC, Section §1918 “Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the government”

Whoever violates the provision of 7311 of title 5 that an individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government; (2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both. and also deprives claimants of “honest services:

Title 18, Section §1346. Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud”

“For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

and the treaties that placed your public offices in that foreign state under international law and under the United Nation jurisdiction:

49 Stat. 3097; Treaty Series 881 CONVENTION ON RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES

1945 IOIA –That the International Organizations Act of December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669; Title 22, Sections 288 to 2886 U.S.C.) the US relinquished every office

TITLE 8 > CHAPTER 12 > SUBCHAPTER I > § 1101

The term “foreign state” includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states

ISSUE FOUR:
JUDGE SERVES AS A

DEBT COLLECTOR

Judges hold public office under Title 28 USC, Chapter 176, Federal Debt Collection Procedure:

Title 28, Chapter 176, Federal Debt Collection Procedure, Section §3002

As used in this chapter:

(2) “Court” means any court created by the Congress of the United States, excluding the United States Tax Court.

(3) “Debt” means—

(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, by the United States; or (B) an amount that is owing to the United States on account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by the United States, or other source of indebtedness to the United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a contract originally entered into by only persons other than the United States;

(8) “Judgment” means a judgment, order, or decree entered in favor of the United States in a court and arising from a civil or criminal proceeding regarding a debt. (15) “United States” means—

(A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or (C) an instrumentality of the United States.

Title 22 USC, Sec. §286. “Acceptance of membership by United States in International Monetary Fund,” states the following:

The President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the United States in the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter referred to as the "Fund"), and in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter referred to as the "Bank"), provided for by the Articles of Agreement of the Fund and the Articles of Agreement of the Bank as set forth in the Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference dated July 22, 1944, and deposited in the archives of the Department of State.

Title 22 USC, Sec. § 286e-13, “Approval of fund pledge to sell gold to provide resources for Reserve Account of Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust,” states the following:

The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to instruct the Fund's pledge to sell, if needed, up to 3,000,000 ounces of the Fund's gold, to restore the resources of the Reserve Account of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust to a level that would be sufficient to meet obligations of the Trust payable to lenders which have made loans to the Loan Account of the Trust that have been used for the purpose of financing programs to Fund members previously in arrears to the Fund.

ISSUE FIVE:
NO IMMUNITY UNDER

“COMMERCE”

All immunity of the United States, and all liability of States, instrumentalities of States, and State officials have been waived under commerce, according to the following US Codes:

Title 15 USC, Commerce, Sec. §1122, “Liability of States, instrumentalities of States, and State officials”

(a) Waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. The United States, all agencies and instrumentalities thereof, and all individuals, firms, corporations, other persons acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall not be immune from suit in Federal or State court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity, for any violation under this Act. (b) Waiver of sovereign immunity by States. Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity for any violation under this Act.

Title 42 USC, Sec. §12202, “State immunity”

A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action against any public or private entity other than a State

Title 42 USC, Sec. §2000d–7, “Civil rights remedies equalization”

(a) General provision

(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. (2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 gives immunity in Administrative Court to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) only when an action is brought by the people against a public, agency or corporate official / department. Under Title 5 USC, Commerce, public offices or officials can be sanctioned.

Title 5, USC, Sec. §551:

(10) “sanction” includes the whole or a part of an agency—

(A) prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition affecting the freedom of a person;

(B) withholding of relief;

(D) destruction, taking, seizure, or withholding of property;

(E) assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, costs, charges, or fees;

(F) requirement, revocation, or suspension of a license; or

(G) taking other compulsory or restrictive action;

Justice is required to be BLIND while holding a SET OF SCALES and a TWO-EDGED SWORD. This symbolizes true justice. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (60 stat 237) would allow the sword to cut in either direction and give the judge immunity by holding his own court office accountable for honest service fraud, obstruction of justice, false statements, malicious prosecution and fraud placed upon the court. Any willful intent to uncover the EYES OF JUSTICE or TILT THE SCALES is a willful intent to deny Due Process, which violates Title 18 USC §1346, “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud,” by perpetrating a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. This is considered fraud and an overthrow of a constitutional form of government and the person depriving the honest service can be held accountable and face punishment under Title 18 USC and Title 42 USC and violates Title 28 USC judicial procedures.

Both Title 18 USC, Crime and Criminal Procedure, and Title 42 USC, Public Health and Welfare, allow the Petitioner to bring an action against the United States and/or the State agencies, departments, and employees for civil rights violations while dealing in commerce. All public officials are placed under Title10 section 333 while under a state of emergency. (Declared or undeclared War – falls under TWEA.)

ISSUE SIX:

COURTS OPERATING UNDER

WAR POWERS ACT

The Courts are operating under the Emergency War Powers Act. The country has been under a declared “state of emergency” for the past 70 years resulting in the Constitution being suspended (See Title 50 USC Appendix – Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917). The Courts have been misusing Title 50 USC, Sec. §23, “Jurisdiction of United States courts and judges,” which provides for criminal jurisdiction over an “enemy of the state,” whereas, Petitioner comes under Title 50 USC Appendix Application Sec. §21, “Claims of naturalized citizens as affected by expatriation” which states the following:

The claim of any naturalized American citizen under the provisions of this Act [sections 1 to 6, 7 to 39, and 41 to 44 of this Appendix] shall not be denied on the ground of any presumption of expatriation which has arisen against him, under the second sentence of section 2 of the Act entitled “An Act in reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad,” approved March 2, 1907, if he shall give satisfactory evidence to the President, or the court, as the case may be, of his uninterrupted loyalty to the United States during his absence, and that he has returned to the United States, or that he, although desiring to return, has been prevented from so returning by circumstances beyond his control.

15 Statutes at Large, Chapter 249 (section 1), enacted July 27 1868, states the following:

PREAMBLE - Rights of American citizens in foreign states.

WHEREAS the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed.

SECTION I - Right of expatriation declared.

THEREFORE, Be it enacted by the Senate of the and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.

SECTION II - Protection to naturalized citizens in foreign states.

And it is further enacted, That all naturalized citizens of the United States, while in foreign states, shall be entitled to, and shall receive from this government, the same protection of persons and property that is accorded to native born citizens in like situations and circumstances. SECTION III - Release of citizens imprisoned by foreign governments to be demanded.

And it is further enacted, That whenever it shall be made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons for such imprisonment, and if it appears to be wrongful and in the violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, it shall be the duty of the President to use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate such release, and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.

Approved, July 27, 1868

The Courts and the States are enforcing the following code on American nationals: Title 50 USC Appendix App, Trading, Act, Sec. §4, “Licenses to enemy or ally of enemy insurance or reinsurance companies; change of name; doing business in United States,” as a result of the passage of The Amendatory Act of March 9, 1933 to Title 50 USC, Trading with the Enemy Act Public Law No. 65-91 (40 Stat. L. 411) October 6, 1917. The original Trading with the Enemy Act excluded the people of the United States from being classified as the enemy when involved in transactions wholly within the United States. The Amendatory Act of March 9, 1933, however, included the people of the United States as the enemy, by incorporating the following language into the Trading With The Enemy Act: “by any person within the United States.” The abuses perpetrated upon the American people are the result of Title 50 USC, Trading With The Enemy Act, which turned the American people into “enemy of the state.”

ISSUE SEVEN:
LANGUAGE NOT CLARIFIED

Clarification of language:

the Plaintiff _______________________ has failed to state the meaning or clarify the definition of words. The Petitioner places before the Court legal definitions and terms, along with NOTICE OF FOREIGN STATE STATUS OF THE COURT. This court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 4(j), is, in fact and at law, a FOREIGN STATE as defined in Title 28 USC §1602, et. seq., the FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583 (hereafter FSIA), and, therefore, lacks jurisdiction in the above captioned case. The above-mentioned “real party in interest” hereby demands full disclosure of the true and limited jurisdiction of this court. Any such failure violates 18 USC §1001, §1505, and §2331. This now violates the PATRIOT ACT, Section 800, Domestic terrorism.

There are three different and distinct forms of the “United States” as revealed by this case law:

“The high Court confirmed that the term "United States" can and does mean three completely different things, depending on the context.” Hooven & Allison Co. vs. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) & United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) & United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. 3 Wheat. 336 336 (1818)

The Court and its officers have failed to state which United States they represent, since they can represent only one, and it’s under Federal Debt Collection Procedure, as a corporation, the United States, Inc., and it’s satellite corporations have no jurisdiction ver Complaintant. An American national and a belligerent claimant, Complainant hereby asserts the right of immunity inherent in the 11th amendment: “The judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens of any Foreign State.” This court, by definition is a FOREIGN STATE, and is misusing the name of this Sovereign American by placing Complainant’s name in all capital letters, as well as by using Complainant’s last name to construe Complainant erroneously, as a “person” which is a “term of art” meaning: a creature of the law, an artificial being, and a CORPORATION or ens legis:

“Ens Legis. L. Lat. A creature of the law; an artificial being, as contrasted with a natural person. Applied to corporations, considered as deriving their existence entirely from the law.” —Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, 1951.

All complaints and suits against such CORPORATION, or ens legis, fall under the aforementioned FSIA and service of process must therefore be made by the clerk of the court, under Section 1608(a)(4) of Title 28 USC, 63 Stat. 111, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2658) [42 FR 6367, Feb. 2, 1977, as amended at 63 FR 16687, Apr. 6, 1998], to the Director of the Office of Special Consular Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State, in Washington, D.C., exclusively, pursuant to 22 CFR §93.1 and §93.2. A copy of the FSIA must be filed with the complaint along with “a certified copy of the diplomatic note of transmittal,” and, “the certification shall state the date and place the documents were delivered.” The foregoing must be served upon the Chief Executive Officer and upon the Registered Agent of the designated CORPORATION or FOREIGN STATE.

MUNICIPAL, COUNTY, or STATE COURTS lack jurisdiction to hear any case since they fall under the definition of FOREIGN STATE, and under all related definitions below. Said jurisdiction lies with the “district court of the United States,” established by Congress in the states under Article III of the Constitution, which are “constitutional courts” and do not include the territorial courts created under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, which are “legislative” courts. Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 21 L.Ed. 966 (1873), (See Title 28 USC, Rule 1101), exclusively, under the FSIA Statutes pursuant to 28 USC §1330.

It is an undisputed, conclusive presumption that the above-mentioned real party in interest is a not a CORPORATION, and, further, is not registered with any Secretary of State as a CORPORATION. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Prosecuting Attorney has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted to the Complaintant, a FATAL DEFECT, and, therefore, the instant case and all related matters must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for lack of in personam, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction, as well as for improper Venue, as well as pursuant to the 11th amendment Foreign State Immunity.

Moreover, the process in the above-captioned case is not “regular on its face.”

Regular on its Face -- “Process is said to be “regular on its face” when it proceeds from the court, officer, or body having authority of law to issue process of that nature, and which is legal in form, and contains nothing to notify, or fairly apprise any one that it is issued without authority.”

TABLE OF DEFINITIONS

Foreign Court The courts of a foreign state or nation. In the United States, this term is frequently applied to the courts of one of the States when their judgment or records are introduced in the courts of another.

Foreign jurisdiction Any jurisdiction foreign to that of the forum; e.g., a sister state or another country. Also, the exercise by a state or nation jurisdiction beyond its own territory. Long-arm service of process is a form of such foreign or extraterritorial jurisdiction

Foreign laws The laws of a foreign country, or of a sister state. In conflicts of law, the legal principles of jurisprudence which are part of the law of a sister state or nation. Foreign laws are additions to our own laws, and in that respect are called “jus receptum.”

Foreign corporation A corporation doing business in one State though chartered or incorporated in another state is a foreign corporation as to the first state, and, as such, is required to consent to certain conditions and restrictions in order to do business in such first state. Under federal tax laws, a foreign corporation is one which is not organized under the law of one of the States or Territories of the United States. I.R.C. § 7701 (a) (5). Service of process on foreign corporation is governed by the Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 See also Corporation.

Foreign service of process Service of process for the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court in the United States upon a person in a foreign country is prescribed by Fed R. Civ. P. 4 (i) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1608. Service of process on foreign corporations is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3).

Foreign states Nations which are outside the United States. Term may also refer to another state; i.e. a sister state.

Foreign immunity With respect to jurisdictional immunity of foreign states, see 28 USC, Sec. §1602 et seq. Title 8 USC, Chapter 12, Subchapter I, Sec. §1101(14) The term “foreign state” includes outlying possessions of a foreign state, but self-governing dominions or territories under mandate or trusteeship shall be regarded as separate foreign states.

Profiteering Taking advantage of unusual or exceptional circumstance to make excessive profit; e.g. selling of scarce or essential goods at inflated price during time of emergency or war.

Person In general usage, a human being (i.e. natural person) though by statute the term may include a firm, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representative, trusts, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. National Labor Relations Act, §2(1).

Definition of the term “person” under Title 26, Subtitle F, Chapter 75, Subchapter D, Sec. Sec. §7343 The term “person” as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs. A corporation is a ”person” within the meaning of equal protection and due process provisions of the United States Constitution. Tertius interveniens A third party intervening; a third party who comes between the parties to a suit; one who interpleads. Gilbert's Forum Romanum. 47.

Writ of error Coram nobis A common-law writ, the purpose of which is to correct a judgment in the same court in which it was rendered, on the ground of error of fact, for which it was statutes provides no other remedy, which fact did not appear of record, or was unknown to the court when judgment was pronounced, and which, if known would have prevented the judgment, and which was unknown, and could of reasonable diligence in time to have been otherwise presented to the court, unless he was prevented from so presenting them by duress, fear, or other sufficient cause. “A writ of error Coram nobis is a common-law writ of ancient origin devised by the judiciary, which constitutes a remedy for setting aside a judgment which for a valid reason should never have been rendered.” 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law. § 1610 (2004).“The principal function of the writ of error Coram nobis is to afford to the court in which an action was tried an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered, and which could not have been presented by a motion for a new trial, appeal or other existing statutory proceeding.” Black's Law Dictionary., 3rd ed., p. 1861; 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1606 b., p. 145; Ford v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 718, 229 S.W.2d 470.At common law in England, it issued from the Court of Kings Bench to a judgment of that court. Its principal aim is to afford the court in which an action was tried an opportunity to correct its own record with reference to a vital fact not known when the judgment was rendered. It is also said that at common law it lay to correct purely ministerial errors of the officers of the court. Furthermore, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” demands the strict adherence to Article IV, section one of the National Constitution so that in all matters before this court, the Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; and to Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, still in force pursuant to Article VI of the National Constitution, so that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State," selective incorporation notwithstanding. The lex domicilii shall also depend upon the Natural Domicile of the above-mentioned “real party in interest.” The lex domicilii, involves the "law of the domicile" in the Conflict of Laws. Conflict is the branch of public law regulating all lawsuits involving a "foreign" law element where a difference in result will occur depending on which laws are applied.

DECLARATION OF STATUS AND RIGHT OF AVOIDANCE

The above-mentioned Petitioner, “the real party in interest” hereby declares the status of a “foreign state” as defined in 28 USC 1331(b)(1), as “a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,” (in the instant case, “otherwise”), (b)(2), “an organ (a vital part) of a foreign state” and (b)(3), “neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c)” (a corporation, an insurer, or the legal representative of a decedent, an infant or an incompetent), “nor created under the laws of any third country.” Furthermore, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is not an artificial, corporate “person” as defined and created by PUBLIC STATUTES, and is not a juristic person which may be “affected” by PUBLIC STATUTES; but, is invested with and bears the status, condition and character of “a sovereign without subjects.” The above-mentioned “real party in interest” is always and at all times present in his / her “asylum home state,” which is “the common case of the place of birth, domicilium originis,” also referred to as Natural Domicile, which is “the same as domicile of origin or domicile by birth,” (See Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed.Cas. 863; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition), which is the source and the seat of her sovereignty and immunity. Accordingly, the above-mentioned “real party in interest” exercises his /her Right of Avoidance and hereby rejects the offered commercial venture and declines to fuse with or to animate the above-mentioned Defendant in Error, or to stand as STRAWMAN “PERSON,” which is defined in Barron’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, (1996), as “a term referred to in commercial and property contexts when a transfer is made to a third party, the strawman “person”, simply for the purpose of retransferring to the transferror in order to accomplish some purpose not otherwise permitted,” i.e., obtaining jurisdiction over the above-mentioned “real party in interest” or relying upon the rebuttable presumption that the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is a corporation. The definition also contains the admonition to “See dummy,” which, at that entry is therein defined as “a strawman; a sham.” The above-mentioned party is, NOT a strawman, NOT a sham, and is certainly NOT a dummy. This DECLARATION OF STATUS constitutes a conclusive presumption, of which the court is bound to take NOTICE, that the “real party in interest” is NOT a corporation; and, the court can exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever over the “real party in interest” or in the above-captioned case, but is duty-bound according to the due process of the law, to which the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is a belligerent claimant, and by the Rule of Law to DISMISS AND REVERSE it.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – PERSON

"This word ‘person’ and its scope and bearing in the law, involving, as it does, legal fictions and also apparently natural beings, it is difficult to understand; but it is absolutely necessary to grasp, at whatever cost, a true and proper understanding to the word in all the phases of its proper use . . . A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or condition with which he is invested . . . not an individual or physical person, but the status, condition or character borne by physical persons . . . The law of persons is the law of status or condition." -- American Law and Procedure, Vol. 13, page 137, 1910.

The following case citation declares the undisputed distinction in fact and at law of the distinction between the term “persons,” which is the plural form of the term “person,” and the word “People” which is NOT the plural form of the term “person.” The above-mentioned “real party in interest” is NOT a subordinate “person,” “subject,” or “agent,” but is a “constituent,” in whom sovereignty abides, a member of the “Posterity of We, the People,” in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom the government has emanated: "The sovereignty of a state does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of its government, but in the People, from whom the government emanated; and they may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty, then in this country, abides with the constituency, and not with the agent; and this remark is true, both in reference to the federal and state government." (Persons are not People).--Spooner v. McConnell, 22 F 939, 943: "Our government is founded upon compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people" --Glass v. Sloop Betsey, supreme Court, 1794. "People of a state are entitled to all rights which formerly belong to the King, by his prerogative." --supreme Court, Lansing v. Smith, 1829. “The United States, as a whole, emanates from the people ... The people, in their capacity as sovereigns, made and adopted the Constitution ..." --supreme Court, 4 Wheat 402. "The governments are but trustees acting under derived authority and have no power to delegate what is not delegated to them. But the people, as the original fountain might take away what they have delegated and entrust to whom they please. ... The sovereignty in every state resides in the people of the state and they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure." --Luther v. Borden, 48 US 1, 12 LEd 581. "While sovereign powers are delegated to ... the government, sovereignty itself remains with the people” --Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, page 370. "There is no such thing as a power of inherent sovereignty in the government of the United States .... In this country sovereignty resides in the people, and Congress can exercise no power which they have not, by their Constitution entrusted to it: All else is withheld." -- Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421. "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it." -- Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979). "Since in common usage the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing that term are ordinarily construed to exclude it." -- U.S. v. Cooper, 312 US 600,604, 61 SCt 742 (1941). "In common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." -- U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947). "Since in common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it." -- US v. Fox 94 US 315. "In common usage the word ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are generally construed to exclude the sovereign." -- U.S. v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. Ill, 2 F.R.D. 528, 530: The following two case citations declare the undisputed doctrine, in fact and at law, that the word (term of art) “person” is a “general word,” and that the “people,” of whom the above-mentioned “real party in interest” is one, “are NOT bound by general words in statutes.” Therefore, statutes do not apply to, operate upon or affect the above-mentioned “real party in interest:” "The word `person' in legal terminology is perceived as a general word which normally includes in its scope a variety of entities other than human beings., --Church of Scientology v. US Department of Justice 612 F2d 417, 425 (1979). "The people, or sovereign are not bound by general words in statutes, restrictive of prerogative right, title or interest, unless expressly named. Acts of limitation do not bind the King or the people. The people have been ceded all the rights of the King, the former sovereign ... It is a maxim of the common law, that when an act is made for the common good and to prevent injury, the King shall be bound, though not named, but when a statute is general and prerogative right would be divested or taken from the King (or the People) he shall not be bound." -- The People v. Herkimer, 4 Cowen (NY) 345, 348 (1825): "In the United States, sovereignty resides in people.” --Perry v. U.S. (294 US 330). "A Sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal Right as against the authority that makes the law on which the Right depends." --Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

In a court of limited jurisdiction, whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes the duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."). Until the plaintiff submits uncontroversial evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is proceeding without subject-matter jurisdiction. Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988)("Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff."). The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the plaintiff. Should the court attempt to place the burden upon the defendant, the court has acted against the law, violates the defendant's due process rights, and the judge under court decisions has immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must proceed exactly according to the law or statute under which it operates. Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943) ("the actions, being statutory proceedings, ...were void for want of power to make them.") ("The judgments were based on orders which were void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering them. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void."); Armstrong v Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921) ("The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it." In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) ("Where a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute."); In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990) ("The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by statute."); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Const. Co., Inc., 101 Ill.App.3d 30, 40, 427 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1981) ("Though a court be one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act on a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction."). "There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215. "A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property." Norwood v. Renfield, 34 C 329; Ex parte Giambonini, 49 P. 732. "Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio." In Re Application of Wyatt, 300 P. 132; Re Cavitt, 118 P2d 846. "Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term." Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P 27. "A court has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and a court must have the authority to decide that question in the first instance." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 171 P2d 8; 331 US 549, 91 L. ed. 1666, 67 S.Ct. 1409. "A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction." Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937. "Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris." Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739. "the fact that the petitioner was released on a promise to appear before a magistrate for an arraignment, that fact is circumstance to be considered in determining whether in first instance there was a probable cause for the arrest." Monroe v. Papa, DC, Ill. 1963, 221 F Supp 685. “Jurisdiction, once challenged, is to be proven, not by the court, but by the party attempting to assert jurisdiction. The burden of proof of jurisdiction lies with the asserter.” See McNutt v. GMAC, 298 US 178. The origins of this doctrine of law may be found in Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 US 308. "A court has no jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, for a basic issue in any case before a tribunal is its power to act, and a court must have the authority to decide that question in the first instance." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 171 P2d 8; 331 US 549, 91 L. ed. 1666, 67 S.Ct. 1409. "Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather, should dismiss the action." Melo v. US, 505 F2d 1026. "The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven." --Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). "Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven." --Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533. "Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack." --Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.

"No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction." --Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768; Title 5 U.S.C., Sec. 556 and 558 (b).

"The proponent of the rule has the burden of proof." --Title 5 U.S.C., Sec. 556 (d). "Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination." --Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910. “Mere good faith assertions of power and authority (jurisdiction) have been abolished.” --Owens v. The City of Independence, "A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction." --Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937. “In a court of limited jurisdiction, whenever a party denies that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, it becomes the duty and the burden of the party claiming that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to provide evidence from the record of the case that the court holds subject-matter jurisdiction.” --Bindell v City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."). “Until the plaintiff submits uncontroversial evidence of subject-matter jurisdiction to the court that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, the court is proceeding without subject-matter jurisdiction.”--Loos v American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841(1988)("Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff."). The law places the duty and burden of subject-matter jurisdiction upon the plaintiff. Should the court attempt to place the burden upon the defendant, the court has acted against the law, violates the defendant's due process rights, and the judge under court decisions has immediately lost subject-matter jurisdiction. In a court of limited jurisdiction, the court must proceed exactly according to the law or statute under which it operates. --Flake v Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943) ("the actions, being statutory proceedings, ...were void for want of power to make them.") ("The judgments were based on orders which were void because the court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering them. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of a subject matter, as here, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment is void."); Armstrong v Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921) "The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it." In Interest of M.V., 288 Ill.App.3d 300, 681 N.E.2d 532 (1st Dist. 1997) ("Where a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute."); In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990) ("The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by statute."); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Const. Co., Inc., 101 Ill.App.3d 30, 40, 427 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1981) ("Though a court be one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act on a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction.").

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – LACK OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Thus, neither Judges nor Government attorneys are above the law. See United States v. Isaacs, 493 F. 2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir. 1974). In our judicial system, few more serious threats to individual liberty can be imagined than a corrupt judge or judges acting in collusion outside of their judicial authority with the Executive Branch to deprive a citizen of his rights. In The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B. 1613), Sir Edward Coke found that Article 39 of the Magna Carta restricted the power of judges to act outside of their jurisdiction such proceedings would be void, and actionable.
When a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is before a person who is not a judge, and actions will lie against them without any regard of the precept or process . . . Id. 77 Eng. Rep. at 1038-41.

A majority of states including Virginia (see, Va. Code §8.01-195.3(3)), followed the English rule to find that a judge had no immunity from suit for acts outside of his judicial capacity or jurisdiction. Robert Craig Waters, 'Liability of Judicial Officers under Section 1983' 79 Yale L. J. (December 1969), pp. 326-27 and 29-30).

Also as early as 1806, in the United States there were recognized restrictions on the power of judges, as well as the placing of liability on judges for acts outside of their jurisdiction. In Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806), the Supreme Court confirmed the right to sue a judge for exercising authority beyond the jurisdiction authorized by statute.

In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 at 360 (1978), the Supreme Court confirmed that a judge would be immune from suit only if he did not act outside of his judicial capacity and/or was not performing any act expressly prohibited by statute. See Block, Stump v Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 4980 Duke L.J. 879 (l980). The Circuit Court overturned this case and the judge was liable.

Judicial immunity may only extend to all judicial acts within the court’s jurisdiction and judicial capacity, but it does not extend to either criminal acts, or acts outside of official capacity or in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' see Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349 (1978). “When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid Constitutional provisions or valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction or judicial capacity, judicial immunity is lost.” --Rankin v. Howard 633 F.2d 844 (1980), Den Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020 (1981).
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), 'where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.' The constitutional requirement of due process of the law is indispensable:"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived or life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Article V, National Constitution. “A judgment can be void . . . where the court acts in a manner contrary to due process.” --Am Jur 2d, §29 Void Judgments, p. 404. "Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris." --Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739. “Moreover, all proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid.” --Olson v. Leith 71 Wyo. 316, 257 P.2d 342. “In criminal cases, certain constitutional errors require automatic reversal,” see State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (1966).

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES –

RECIPROCAL IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IMMUNITIES ACT,
PUBLIC LAW 79-291, 29 DECEMBER 1945(Public Law 291-79th Congress) TITLE I Section 2.(b) International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of Judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract. (d) In so far as concerns customs duties and internal-revenue taxes imposed upon or by reason of importation, and the procedures in connection therewith; the registration of foreign agents; and the treatment of official communications, the privileges, exemptions, and immunities to which international organizations shall be entitled shall be those accorded under similar circumstances to foreign governments. Section 9. The privileges, exemptions, and immunities of international organizations and of their officers and employees, and members of their families, suites, and servants, provided for in this title, shall be granted notwithstanding the fact that the similar privileges, exemptions, and immunities granted to a foreign government, its officers, or employees, may be conditioned upon the existence of reciprocity by that foreign government: Provided, That nothing contained in this title shall be construed as precluding the Secretary of State from withdrawing the privileges exemptions, and immunities herein provided from persons who are nationals of any foreign country on the ground that such country is failing to accord corresponding privileges, exemptions, and immunities to citizens of the United States. Also see 22 USC § 611 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE; and, 22 USC § 612, Registration statement, concerning the absolute requirement of registration with the Attorney General as a “foreign principal,” due to the undisputed status of the court and its alleged officers and employees as FOREIGN AGENTS, described supra. This requirement shall be deemed to include, but is not limited to, an affidavit of non-communist association.

CORPORATION NAMES

DELAWARE CODE TITLE 8, Chapters 6, Section § 617:

CORPORATE NAME

The corporate name of a corporation organized under this chapter shall contain either a word or words descriptive of the professional service to be rendered by the corporation or shall contain the last names of 1 or more of its present, prospective or former shareholders or of persons who were associated with a predecessor person, partnership, corporation or other organization or whose name or names appeared in the name of such predecessor organization.

Texas Administrative Code

Subject: 1 TAC § 79.31 CORPORATIONS (ENTITY NAMES)

§ 79.31. Characters of Print Acceptable in Names

(a) Entity names may consist of letters of the Roman alphabet, Arabic numerals, and certain symbols capable of being reproduced on a standard English language typewriter, or combination thereof.

(b) Only upper case or capitol letters, with no distinction as to type face or font, will be recognized.

Delaware legislation, March 10 1899

“An Act Providing General Corporate Law” This Act allow the corporation to become a “PERSON”

U.S. G.P.O. STYLE MANUAL

3. Capitalization Rules

(See also Chapter 4 “Capitalization Examples” and Chapter 9 “Abbreviations and Letter Symbols”)

Nationalities, etc.

5.22. The table on Demonyms in Chapter 17 “Useful Tables” shows forms

to be used for nouns and adjectives denoting nationality.

5.23. In designating the natives of the States, the following forms will be

used.

SUPREME COURT RULING ON CORPORATE PERSON

SANTA CLARA COUNTY v. SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO., 118 U.S. 394

A legal person, also called juridical person or juristic person,[1] is a legal entity through which the law allows a group of natural persons to act as if they were a single composite individual for certain purposes, or in some jurisdictions, for a single person to have a separate legal personality other than their own.[2][3] This legal fiction does not mean these entities are human beings, but rather means that the law allows them to act as persons for certain limited purposes

New York Central R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)

United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)

TITLE 26 > Subtitle F > CHAPTER 75 > Subchapter D > § 7343

Sec. 7343. Definition of the term person.

The term "person" as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs

ISSUE EIGHT:

COURT LACKS JUDICIAL POWER

IN LAW OR EQUITY

Petitioner also points out that the Federal or State or County or municipal government can be sued in their corporate capacity when functioning as federal debt collectors under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). If the Federal or State government can claim immunity under the 11th Amendment, then the Federal or State or County or municipal government cannot use Law or Equity jurisdiction against the Petitioner or the people in Court, since the people are not subject to a “foreign state” under Title 28 USC, Judicial Procedure, §§1602 -1610. The States are made up of “State Citizens,” and under the 11th Amendment, “State Citizens” cannot be sued by a “foreign state.”

The Petitioner would like point out to the Federal or State or County or municipal government that Article III section 2 and the 11th Amendment of the Constitution are in conflict. The court cannot convene under Article III equity jurisdiction and then have its public officers claim 11th amendment immunity. The court is operating in a foreign state capacity against the people once the court officials take their oath, and they cannot have it both ways.

Article III Section 2

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;—to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;—to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;—to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;—to controversies between two or more states;—between a state and citizens of another state;—between citizens of different states;—between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

The ratification of the Eleventh Amendment on February 7, 1795 effectively altered Article III Section 2, and now “All” public offices are using the Eleventh Amendment as a defense against being sued, whereas, the Eleventh Amendment actually removed protection since judicial power no longer extended to any suit in Law or Equity, and subsequently afforded the people the same protection as any level of government. The people cannot be charged in Law or Equity claims by anyone in the government. The court only has one action as revealed by the Rules of Civil Procedure: “Rule 2—One form of Action : There is only one form of action – the civil action.” Civil action can be brought only by the people and not any level of government.

Amendment XI

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

The Petitioner is aware of the Stripping Doctrine. But the Constitution was amended again in 1868 to protect various civil rights, and Section 5 of the 14th Amendment granted Congress the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of that amendment. The courts have recognized that this new amendment, again a consensus of the people, abrogates the immunity provided by the 11th Amendment. When Congress enacted legislation under the auspices of Section 5 of the 14th Amendment, they specifically abrogated 11th Amendment immunity, and states can, under such federal statutes be prosecuted in federal court.

The Petitioner will refer the Court’s attention to the 1875 Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court ruled that this Congressional enactment was unconstitutional. Civil Rights Acts (1866, 1870, 1875, 1957, 1960, 1964, 1968) US legislation. The Civil Rights Act (1866) gave African-Americans citizenship and extended civil rights to all persons born in the USA (except Native Americans). The 1870 Act was passed to re-enact the previous measure, which was considered to be of dubious constitutionality. In 1883, the US Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the 1870 law. The 1875 Act was passed to outlaw discrimination in public places because of race or previous servitude. The act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (1883–85), (U.S. Supreme Court Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) Civil Rights Cases Submitted October Term, 1882 Decided October 16th, 1888 109 U.S. 3) which stated that the 14th Amendment, the constitutional basis of the act, protected individual rights against infringement by the states, not by other individuals. The 1957 Act established the Civil Rights Commission to investigate violations of the 15th Amendment. The 1960 Act enabled court-appointed federal officials to protect black voting rights. An act of violence to obstruct a court order became a federal offence. The 1964 Act established as law equal rights for all citizens in voting, education, public accommodations and in federally-assisted programs. The 1968 Act guaranteed equal treatment in housing and real estate to all citizens

No level of the Executive or Judicial government has ever introduced into any Court action a real party of interest under Rule 17. The Court has no jurisdiction under 12(b) (1), (2), (3) over the Petitioner or people. Decision and Rationale: The 8-1 decision of the Court was delivered by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, with John Marshall Harlan of Kentucky alone in dissent. The Court decided that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional. Neither the 13th nor the 14th amendment empowers the Congress to legislate in matters of racial discrimination in the private sector, Bradley wrote. “The 13th Amendment has respect, not to distinctions of race…but to slavery.…” The 14th Amendment, he continued, applied to State, not private, actions; furthermore, the abridgment of rights presented in this case are to be considered as “ordinary civil injuries” rather than the imposition of badges of slavery.

Bradley commented that “individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the 14th Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.” Therefore, the Court limited the impact of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.

ISSUE NINE:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE UNDER

TITLE 5 USC, SUBCHAPTER II

The Petitioner reminds the Court that it is an Article I Administrative Court and lacks judicial power for review per the Eleventh Amendment. The Plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies before moving to a judicial review on the Petitioner. The Petitioner was denied administrative remedies which violates judicial review and the requirement of honest service, for the Court lacks judicial power to hear this case under the Eleventh Amendment. (Not sure if the words are right.)

If the Court claims it is in fact an Article 3 Court with judicial power under Article 3 section 2, then the Petitioner’s constitutionally-protected rights and statutory rights have been violated. The Court has failed to comply with protecting the rights of the Petitioner that a reasonable person would do under the Constitution and under the Bill Rights and the folllowing amendments: first, fourth fifth, seventh (a suit in common law), eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and the fourteenth.

ISSUE TEN:
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
AND U.S. ATTORNEY ARE ADMINISTRATIVE ONLY

The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the inferior courts and the Office of Attorney General, as well as the position of U. S. Attorney for each district. The history is set forth in the United States Attorneys’ Manual: The States Attorney General Office and all whom prosecute in the NAME OF THE STATE come under the same judiciary act which created the inferior Courts of the States.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL

CHAPTER 3-2.000: United States Attorneys, Assistant United States Attorneys, Special Assistants, and the AGAC

3-2.110 HISTORY

The Office of the United States Attorney was created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided for the appointment "in each district of a meet person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States ... whose duty it shall be to prosecute in each district all delinquents for crimes and offenses, recognizable under the authority of the United States, and all civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned ..." 1 Stat. 92. Initially, United States Attorneys were not supervised by the Attorney General (1 Op.Att'y Gen. 608) but Congress, in the Act of August 2, 1861, (Ch. 37, 12 Stat. 185) charged the Attorney General with the "general superintendence and direction duties ..." While the precise nature of the superintendence and direction was not defined, the Department of Justice Act of June 22, 1870 (Ch. 150, 16 Stat. 164) and the Act of June 30, 1906 (Ch. 39, 35, 34 Stat. 816) clearly established the power of the Attorney General to supervise criminal and civil proceedings in any district. See 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 491; 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 507. Today, as in 1789, the United States Attorney retains, among other responsibilities, the duty to "prosecute for all offenses against the United States." See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 547(1). This duty is to be discharged under the supervision of the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 519.

3-2.140 AUTHORITY

Although the Attorney General has supervision over all litigation to which the United States or any agency thereof is a party, and has direction of all United States Attorneys, and their assistants, in the discharge of their respective duties (28 U.S.C. Secs. 514, 515, 519), each United States Attorney, within his/her district, has the responsibility and authority to: (a) prosecute for all offenses against the United States; (b) prosecute or defend, for the government, all civil actions, suits, or proceedings in which the United States is concerned; (c) appear on behalf of the defendants in all civil actions, suits or proceedings pending in the district against collectors, or other officers of the revenue or customs for any act done by them or for the recovery of any money exacted by or paid to such officers, and by them paid into the Treasury; (d) institute and prosecute proceedings for the collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures incurred for violation of any revenue law unless satisfied upon investigation that justice does not require such proceedings; (e) make such reports as the Attorney General shall direct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 547.

The Attorney General has limited jurisdiction to prosecute. The jurisdiction derives from Article 1 section 8, to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with Indian Tribes. The Office of Attorney General of the federal and State government and all employees under that office, lacks the authority to bring charges against the people it violate article I section 8 .

Now that it has been shown that the position of Attorney General was created by Congress under the Judiciary Act of 1789, making the Prosecutor’s role Judicial, and not Executive / administrative, the Attorney General falls under the 11th amendment:

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

The Office of Attorney General, and all employees of the Office of Attorney General, lack the authority to set forth any action in any Court in LAW OR EQUITY, per the 11th amendment, as the Office clearly comes under “Judicial” and not “Executive.”

By virtue of this grant of statutory authority and the practical realities of representing the United States throughout the country, United States Attorneys conduct most of the trial work in which the United States is a party. They are the principal federal law enforcement officers in their judicial districts. In the exercise of their prosecutorial discretion, United States Attorneys construe and implement the policy of the Department of Justice. Their professional abilities and the need for their impartiality in administering justice directly affect the public's perception of federal law enforcement.

Now, by and through the 11th amendment, the Courts and the position of Attorney General no longer derive Article III Constitutional standing, but now have Article I administrative standing, thereby lacking any authority in Law or Equity, and limited to functioning as administrative review boards to hear cases against agencies, departments, and public officials brought by the people. The Courts and Prosecutors lack jurisdiction in any criminal action against the people, as they are, by Congressional mandate, administrative courts. They have no force in effect in Law or Equity, and any action is a “presumption,” which is in direct conflict with the constitution, statutory laws, Congressional mandate and the procedures, as the facts have been placed before the Court and the prosecution, or if the State, as such, is a defendant, it is then required to rebut or disprove that such Congressional mandate, as laid out in this document, does not exist. The Court’s only choice is to rule in favor of the Petitioner / People.

Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines "presumption" as follows:

A presumption is a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until presumption is rebutted. ... A legal device which operates in the absence of other proof to require that certain inferences be drawn from the available evidence.

ISSUE ELEVEN:

GOLD FRINGE FLAG

The Petitioner hereby is placing the Court, the Prosecutor, and any other agent of the Court, on Notice regarding the Gold Fringe Flag with the Eagle flying in the Courtroom. This Gold Fringe Flag comes under the United States Army Regulation 840-10 as a Military Flag. If this flag is flown, it then represents Military and Presidential authority over this hearing.

TITLE 10 > Subtitle A > PART I > CHAPTER 15 §333 cannot be violated and is the controlling law.

TITLE 10 > Subtitle A > PART I > CHAPTER 15 §333
Interference with State and Federal law

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws.

In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.

Title 4 of the United States Code clearly states how the American flag is to be displayed and any such violation holds a one year penalty for ALL Court officers standing before the flag. This Gold Fringe Flag with the Eagle represents martial rule, martial law and military court martial. This Gold Fringe Flag does not represent admiralty or maritime jurisdiction or contract jurisdiction. Any failure on the part of this court or any of its court officers to uphold Title 10 §333 are in violation of 18 USC Chapter 115 TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, as well as the following criminal codes: 18 USC 241, 242, 1001, 1346, 1621, 1918 and a NOTICE OF FELONY will be attached to further advise of other federal statute violations by the court and its officers.

This Court and its officers are now put on notice to come into compliance with the law under military guidelines. If the Court is operating under martial law, then the constitution has been suspended and public offices are not operating under the law or the constitution and all elections or appointments have been done under fraudulent means. The Court and its officers are educated in the law since they are the ones that wrote the statutes that have been placed in this Court record.

CONCLUSION AND RECTUM ROGARE

The facts and the law contained herein are the Truth; and we hold said Truths to be self-evident; and self-evident Truths are undisputed and incontrovertible, no oral argument is requested, for no words can alter or overcome these Truths; an Truth is Sovereign: She comes from God and bears His message, from whatever quarter her great eyes may look down upon you; Psalms 117:2; John 8:32; II Corinthians. 13:8; THEREFORE; this court must perform its duty under the Rule of Law, do Justice, Rectum Rogare, and DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND REVERSE the above-alphanumeric code # without delay for “Justice delayed is Justice denied.” Rectum Rogare - "to do right; to petition the judge to do right." --Black's Law Dictionary 4th edition.

AMENDATORY RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF MARCH 11, 1868

An Act to amend the act passed March 23, 1867, entitled, "An Act supplementary to 'An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel states,' passed March 2, 1867, and to facilitate their restoration.

SUPPLEMENTARY RECONSTRUCTION ACT OF FORTIETH CONGRESS.

An Act supplementary to an act entitled "An act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel states," passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate restoration. "

This act created the 14th amendment federal citizen under section 3 of the federal constitution. All who hold public office fall under this section as UNITED STATES citizens. Those who hold office have knowingly and willingly given up their citizenship to this country under Title 8 Section §1481 to become a foreign state agent under 22 USC. The oath of office to the constitution requires office-holders to uphold and maintain our Constitutional form of government under the people’s authority. This right was never surrendered by the people; failure to do so violates 10 USC §333 and 18 USC §1918, chapter 115 §2382, §2383, §1505, §1001, §241, §242, 42 USC §1981 & 31 USC §3729 just to name a few.

The Federal Debt Collection Procedure places all courts under equity and commerce and under the International Monetary Fund. The International Monetary Fund comes under the Uniform Commercial Code under banking and business interest and Trust laws. This makes the Court / Judges trustee over the trust and responsible whether or not the Petitioner understands the trust issue. The 1933 bankruptcy act placed all public officials in a fiduciary position to write off the public debt, since this Nation is not solvent. The TWEA suspended the U.S. Constitution in the court room, and therefore, the standard American flag in the courtroom was replaced with a military Admiralty flag for dealing with alien enemy residents. The people never rescinded their nationality to the real united States of America. Those who hold public office rescinded their nationality to become a foreign agent in order to hold public office. International law requires the judge to uphold the people’s Constitutional form of government as defined in the “Federalist Papers”.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure / Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 2 only allows civil action, and under Rule 17, a real party of interest has to be present in the courtroom in order for there to be any claims of injury or damages against “the people.” Any charges under the “UNITED STATES” or “THE STATE OF……..” fall under the TWEA Section 23. The people are not subject to this jurisdiction as it is a Foreign State jurisdiction. The people hold 11th amendment immunity to claims in equity and commerce from a foreign state. The courts lack jurisdiction over the Complainant by Congressional mandate. For the aforestated reasons, the Respondent / Court lacks jurisdiction under Rule 4(j) & 12(b) (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) over this Complainant.

Adversarial System; Mack vs. City of Detroit, Chief Justice Cavanagh, No. 118468, 2002.

"The adversarial system ensures the best presentation of arguments and theories because each party is motivated to succeed. Moreover, the adversarial system attempts to ensure that an active judge refrain from allowing a preliminary understanding of the issues to improperly influence the final decision. This allows the judiciary to keep an open mind until the proofs and arguments have been adequately submitted. In spite of these underlying concerns, the majority today claims that the benefits of full briefing are simply a formality that can be discarded without care. The majority fails to comprehend how the skilled advocates in this case could have added anything insightful in the debate over the proper interpretation of a century's worth of precedent. Whatever its motivation, the majority undermines the foundations of our adversarial system.

The Complainant is covered under Title 18 § 4 Misprision of felony & Title 31 USC §3729 False Claims as Whistle-blowers.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 1

§ 4 Misprision of felony

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.

TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 37 > SUBCHAPTER III
§3729. False claims(a) Liability for Certain Acts.— Any person who— (1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government; (3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid;

TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 37 > SUBCHAPTER III

§3730 Civil actions for false claims (b) Actions by Private Persons.— (1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.

These are the laws as we know them—clear, precise and written by those with superior knowledge of the law: “LAWYERS”, not the people. The people cannot be held accountable if there is a failure to clarify or if its “incomprehensible, baseless assertions and citations to disjointed and/or irrelevant legal authority, grammatically, logically and legally incomprehensible, frivolous and unintelligible” or a conflict in the laws. This then goes back to those “LAWYERS” who created this conflict in law to be held accountable. Any failure for the judge to adhere is a violation under 18 USC 1001, 1346 1505, 2331 and 10 USC 333 This now violate the PATRIOT ACT SECTION 800 HOMELAND SECUIRTY and other Departments now has to be notify of domestic terrorism.

Submitted this _______ day of _________________, 2010.

__________________________

NAME HERE AND ADDRESS

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

NOTICE OF FELONY

To:

Administrative Office of the Courts, P.O. Box 2448, Raleigh, N.C. 27602-2448

Now comes Rodney Dale; Class Private Attorney General, COMPLAINANT, acting in the name of We the People and pursuant to Article VI clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States of America, the Supremacy clause and the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, Title 42. U.S.C. § 1988 & 1983 Civil Rights.

CHARGES

1 Violation of the original intent of the 14th Amendment, section three, ‘persons’ within the 14th Amendment. The original intent of the Federal Bill of Rights in qualifying for federal grants and loans.

2 Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI section 601-Non-discrimination of federally assisted programs under the Appalachian Regional Commission, The Highway Safety Act of 1966, The National Drivers Act of 1982 for states compact as determined in opinion by the United States Supreme Court:

The United States Supreme Court (359 U.S. 275 at 285)

Interstate Compacts

Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution grants states the authority to enter into an “agreement or compact with another state” with the consent of Congress. The constitution contains no restrictions on the subject matter of a compact and is silent about the process by which states may enter into compacts, with the exception of the required consent of Congress. The United States Supreme Court (359 U.S. 275 at 285) opined in 1959 that an interstate compact is a “contract” protected by the Constitution’s contract clause forbidding a state legislature to enact a “law impairing the obligation of contracts.”

COUNT I

Judge___________________, et al, having taken an Oath to support and defend the United States Constitution, did willfully and knowingly violate said oath in an open court of Law by failing to timely move to protect and defend the United States Constitution, that being a felony of perjury of their Oaths of Office.

CONGRESS DECLARES BIBLE "THE WORD OF GOD Public Law 97-280, 96 stat 1211” Oct 4 1982 & Executive Order 6100 of Sept 22 1990.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 79 > § 1621 Perjury generally

Whoever—

(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true; or

(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, wilfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;

is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the United States.

COUNT II

Judge _______________ et, al owing allegiance to the United States and the United States Constitution, did willfully and knowingly give aid and comfort to those et al defendants whose acts are subversive to the United States and as such are destroying our children, our homes, our churches, our schools, our business, our contracts, our money system, and our Government. Said acts defined in the United States Constitution Article III section 3, is punishable under USC Title 18 sections 3, 4, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384.

TITLE 18 § 4. Misprision of felony

TITLE 18 § 2381. Treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

TITLE 18 § 2382. Misprision of treason

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than seven years, or both.

TITLE 18 § 2383. Rebellion or insurrection

Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

TITLE 18 § 2384. Seditious conspiracy

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

COUNT III

Judge ________________ et al, having taken an oath to support and defend the United States and the United States Constitution, did willfully and knowingly violate said oath in an open court of Law by violating the constitutional Rights of Sovereign American Citizens by not upholding his/her Bill of Rights which is a felony.

TITLE 18 § 241. Conspiracy against rights

If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or

If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured—

They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

TITLE 18 § 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, wilfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.

COUNT IV

Judge _______________ et al, while serving in any public office elected and appointed, for having taken a fraudulent oath as ‘fiduciary trustee’ of a political subdivision of the state in an assumed position as a private ‘person’ not having immunity or privilege within the intent of the original 14th Amendment nor having 11th Amendment standing, did willfully and knowingly violate the constitutional Rights of those Citizen electors. That the entire classification of 14th Amendment section three ‘persons’ have engaged in section four rebellion and insurrection against Lawful authority and have created a public debt from said un-Lawful offices and policies.

TITLE 31 SEC. 3729. FALSE CLAIMS
(a) Liability for certain acts.--Any person who--

(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;

(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid;

(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or wilfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;

(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;

(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or

(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person, except that if the court finds that–

(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;

(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such violation; and

(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation;

the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.

(b) Knowing and knowingly defined.--For purposes of this section, the terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to information--

(1) has actual knowledge of the information;

(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or

(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.

(c) Claim defined.—For purposes of this section, “claim” includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.

(d) Exemption from disclosure.—Any information furnished pursuant to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.

(e) Exclusion.—This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

TITLE 18 § 1834. Criminal forfeiture

(3) The court, in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of this chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed, that the person forfeit to the United States—

(4) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and

(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation, if the court in its discretion so determines, taking into consideration the nature, scope, and proportionality of the use of the property in the offense.

(b) Property subject to forfeiture under this section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except for subsections (d) and (j) of such section, which shall not apply to forfeitures under this section.

TITLE 18 § 1957. Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity

(3) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

(b)

(3) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the punishment for an offense under this section is a fine under title 18, United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than ten years or both.

(2) The court may impose an alternate fine to that imposable under paragraph (1) of not more than twice the amount of the criminally derived property involved in the transaction.

© In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that the offense from which the criminally derived property was derived was specified unlawful activity.

(d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are—

(3) that the offense under this section takes place in the United States or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; or

(2) that the offense under this section takes place outside the United States and such special jurisdiction, but the defendant is a United States person (as defined in section 3077 of this title, but excluding the class described in paragraph (2)(D) of such section).

(e) Violations of this section may be investigated by such components of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General may direct, and by such components of the Department of the Treasury as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct, as appropriate and, with respect to offenses over which the United States Postal Service has jurisdiction, by the Postal Service. Such authority of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postal Service shall be exercised in accordance with an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postal Service, and the Attorney General.

(f) As used in this section—

(3) the term “monetary transaction” means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as defined in section 1956 ©(5) of this title) by, through, or to a financial institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title), including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956 ©(4)(B) of this title, but such term does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution;

(2) the term “criminally derived property” means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense; and

(3) the term “specified unlawful activity” has the meaning given that term in section 1956 of this title.

TITLE 42 Sec. 2000d-7. - Civil rights remedies equalization

(a) General provision

(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.

(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.

(b) Effective date

The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall take effect with respect to violations that occur in whole or in part after October 21, 1986

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63 > § 1341

§ 1341. Frauds and swindles

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.

94118 U.S.C. 1343—Elements of Wire Fraud

The elements of wire fraud under Section 1343 directly parallel those of the mail fraud statute, but require the use of an interstate telephone call or electronic communication made in furtherance of the scheme. United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576, 583 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 234 (6th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)); United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (wire fraud is identical to mail fraud statute except that it speaks of communications transmitted by wire); see also, e.g., United States v. Profit, 49 F.3d 404, 406 n. 1 (8th Cir.) (the four essential elements of the crime of wire fraud are: (1) that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised or participated in a scheme to defraud another out of money; (2) that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire communications were in fact used) (citing Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Eighth Circuit 6.18.1341 (West 1994)), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2289 (1995); United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1994) (two elements comprise the crime of wire fraud: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) use of interstate wire communication to facilitate that scheme); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (essential elements of wire fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute the scheme), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 193 (1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (to prove wire fraud government must show (1) scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant's knowing and willful participation in scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Wire fraud requires proof of (1) a scheme to defraud; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication to further the scheme.").

COUNT V

Judge _______________, et al, having taken an oath to support and defend the United States and the United States Constitution and the statutes of the United States and of this State, did willfully and knowingly violate said oath by means of Obstruction of Justice of the Law by violating the constitutional Rights of Sovereign American Citizens by not upholding his/her Bill of Rights which is a felony.

ANTI-COURRUPTION ACT NO 6494

The term “public officials” means the persons falling under any of the following:

(a) The public officials under the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act, and other persons who are recognized by other Acts as public officials in terms of qualifications, appointments, education and training, services, remunerations, status guarantee, etc; and

(b)The heads of organizations related to the civil service provided for in subparagraph 1(d) and the employees of such organizations.

The term “act of corruption” means the act falling under any of the following:

(a) The act of any public official's seeking gains for himself/herself or for any third party by abusing his/her position or authority or violating Acts and subordinate statutes in connection with his/her duties; and

(b) The act of causing damages to the property of any public agency in violation of Acts and subordinate statutes, in the process of executing the budget of the relevant public agency, acquiring, managing, or disposing of the property of the relevant public agency, or entering into and executing a contract to which the relevant public agency is a party.

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 63 > § 1346. Definition of “scheme or artifice to defraud” For the purposes of this chapter, the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.

US Attorneys > USAM > Title 9 > Criminal Resource Manual 1721

1721Protection of Government Processes—Obstruction of Justice—Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1503

Section 1503 of Title 18, United States Code, as amended by the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, forbids tampering with or retaliating against any grand or petit juror, or any officer in or of any court of the United States by threats or force or by "endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede." Section 1503 also contains an omnibus clause prohibiting the obstruction of "the due administration of justice." By virtue of the omnibus clause, many courts have held that it is possible to obstruct justice under section 1503 by means similar to, but different from, those specifically enumerated in the first part of the provision. United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950 (1993); United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 850-52 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, sub. nom. Phillips v. United States, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982). A party may be prosecuted under section 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct justice, United States v. Neal, supra; United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989); it is no defense that such obstruction was unsuccessful, United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Neal, supra; or that it was impossible to accomplish, United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989); United States v. Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987).

The term "officer in or of any court of the United States" includes:

· United States District Judges, United States v. Jones, 663 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1981) (by implication); United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1979) (by implication), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (by implication); United States v. Margoles, 294 F.2d 371, 373 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961);

· United States Attorneys, Jones, supra; United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888, 890 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 653 (1940);

· United States Bankruptcy Judges, United States v. Fulbright, 69 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir. 1995) (by implication);

· Supreme Court Justices, United States Courts of Appeals Judges, United States Magistrate Judges, clerks of Federal courts, law clerks to Federal judges, Federal court staff attorneys, Federal court reporters, Federal prosecutors and defense counsel.

Because 18 U.S.C. § 1503 applies to civil, as well as criminal judicial proceedings, Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1956); Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911, 912 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 590 (1924); see Nye v. United States, 137 F.2d 73 (4th Cir.) (by implication), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 755 (1943), private attorneys are, arguably, also covered by the statute.

A venireman is a "petit juror" within the meaning of section 1503. United States v. Jackson, 607 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); see United States v. Osborn, 415 F.2d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970).

The majority of United States Courts of Appeals have held that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 may be used to charge a defendant with witness tampering. United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 944 (1993); United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Branch, 850 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1076 (1986); United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984). But see United States v. Masterpol, 940 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1991) (construing the 1988 amendment to section 1512 as evidence of Congress's intent that witnesses were removed entirely from section 1503).

US Attorneys > USAM > Title 9 > Criminal Resource Manual 1724

1724Protection of Government Processes—Omnibus Clause -- 18 U.S.C. § 1503

The omnibus clause of section 1503 "makes an offense of any proscribed endeavor, without regard to the technicalities of the law or to the law of impossibility." United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989), citing Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). The clause was "intended to cover all endeavors to obstruct justice" and as such "was drafted with an eye to the variety of corrupt methods by which the proper administration of justice may be impeded or thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined." United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d at 632.The principal limitation to the scope of the omnibus clause is the pending judicial proceeding requirement. See this Manual at 1722. Courts have given an equally broad reading to the nearly identical, but less frequently litigated, omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. See, e.g., United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 850 (1971).

Civil forfeiture

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 46 > § 981

§ 981. Civil forfeiture

(a)

(1) The following property is subject to forfeiture to the United States:

(A) Any property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such property.

(B) Any property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of the United States, constituting, derived from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation, or any property used to facilitate such an offense, if the offense—

(i) involves trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons technology or material, or the manufacture, importation, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance (as that term is defined for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act), or any other conduct described in section 1956 (c)(7)(B);

(ii) would be punishable within the jurisdiction of the foreign nation by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year; and

(iii) would be punishable under the laws of the United States by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, if the act or activity constituting the offense had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States.

(C) Any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of section 215, 471, 472, 473, 474, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 485, 486, 487, 488, 501, 502, 510, 542, 545, 656, 657, 842, 844, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1014, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1032, or 1344 of this title or any offense constituting “specified unlawful activity” (as defined in section 1956 (c)(7) of this title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.

(D) Any property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to the gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, from a violation of—

(i) section 666 (a)(1) (relating to Federal program fraud);

(ii) section 1001 (relating to fraud and false statements);

(iii) section 1031 (relating to major fraud against the United States);

(iv) section 1032 (relating to concealment of assets from conservator or receiver of insured financial institution);

(v) section 1341 (relating to mail fraud); or

(vi) section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),

if such violation relates to the sale of assets acquired or held by the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as conservator or receiver for a financial institution, or any other conservator for a financial institution appointed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Office of Thrift Supervision or the National Credit Union Administration, as conservator or liquidating agent for a financial institution.

(E) With respect to an offense listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) committed for the purpose of executing or attempting to execute any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent statements, pretenses, representations or promises, the gross receipts of such an offense shall include all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which thereby is obtained, directly or indirectly.

(F) Any property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to the gross proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, from a violation of—

(i) section 511 (altering or removing motor vehicle identification numbers);

(ii) section 553 (importing or exporting stolen motor vehicles);

(iii) section 2119 (armed robbery of automobiles);

(iv) section 2312 (transporting stolen motor vehicles in interstate commerce); or

(v) section 2313 (possessing or selling a stolen motor vehicle that has moved in interstate commerce).

(G) All assets, foreign or domestic—

(i) of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating any any [1] Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section 2332b (g)(5)) against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their property, and all assets, foreign or domestic, affording any person a source of influence over any such entity or organization;

(ii) acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the purpose of supporting, planning, conducting, or concealing any Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section 2332b (g)(5) [2] against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their property;

(iii) derived from, involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit any Federal crime of terrorism (as defined in section 2332b (g)(5)) against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their property; or

(iv) of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating any act of international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against any international organization (as defined in section 209 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4309 (b)) or against any foreign Government.[3] Where the property sought for forfeiture is located beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, an act in furtherance of such planning or perpetration must have occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States.

(H) Any property, real or personal, involved in a violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation, of section 2339C of this title.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the term “proceeds” is defined as follows:

(A) In cases involving illegal goods, illegal services, unlawful activities, and telemarketing and health care fraud schemes, the term “proceeds” means property of any kind obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of the commission of the offense giving rise to forfeiture, and any property traceable thereto, and is not limited to the net gain or profit realized from the offense.

(B) In cases involving lawful goods or lawful services that are sold or provided in an illegal manner, the term “proceeds” means the amount of money acquired through the illegal transactions resulting in the forfeiture, less the direct costs incurred in providing the goods or services. The claimant shall have the burden of proof with respect to the issue of direct costs. The direct costs shall not include any part of the overhead expenses of the entity providing the goods or services, or any part of the income taxes paid by the entity.

(C) In cases involving fraud in the process of obtaining a loan or extension of credit, the court shall allow the claimant a deduction from the forfeiture to the extent that the loan was repaid, or the debt was satisfied, without any financial loss to the victim.

(b)

(1) Except as provided in section 985, any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under subsection (a) may be seized by the Attorney General and, in the case of property involved in a violation investigated by the Secretary of the Treasury or the United States Postal Service, the property may also be seized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Postal Service, respectively.

(2) Seizures pursuant to this section shall be made pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as provided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, except that a seizure may be made without a warrant if—

(A) a complaint for forfeiture has been filed in the United States district court and the court issued an arrest warrant in rem pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims;

(B) there is probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture and—

(i) the seizure is made pursuant to a lawful arrest or search; or

(ii) another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement would apply; or

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to this subsection by a judicial officer in any district in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under section 1355 (b) of title 28, and may be executed in any district in which the property is found, or transmitted to the central authority of any foreign state for service in accordance with any treaty or other international agreement. Any motion for the return of property seized under this section shall be filed in the district court in which the seizure warrant was issued or in the district court for the district in which the property was seized.

(4)

(A) If any person is arrested or charged in a foreign country in connection with an offense that would give rise to the forfeiture of property in the United States under this section or under the Controlled Substances Act, the Attorney General may apply to any Federal judge or magistrate judge in the district in which the property is located for an ex parte order restraining the property subject to forfeiture for not more than 30 days, except that the time may be extended for good cause shown at a hearing conducted in the manner provided in rule 43(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(B) The application for the restraining order shall set forth the nature and circumstances of the foreign charges and the basis for belief that the person arrested or charged has property in the United States that would be subject to forfeiture, and shall contain a statement that the restraining order is needed to preserve the availability of property for such time as is necessary to receive evidence from the foreign country or elsewhere in support of probable cause for the seizure of the property under this subsection.

(c) Property taken or detained under this section shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, subject only to the orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction thereof. Whenever property is seized under this subsection, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, may—

(1) place the property under seal;

(2) remove the property to a place designated by him; or

(3) require that the General Services Administration take custody of the property and remove it, if practicable, to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.

(d) For purposes of this section, the provisions of the customs laws relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws, the disposition of such property or the proceeds from the sale of such property under this section, the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures, and the compromise of claims (19 U.S.C. 1602 et seq.), insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under this section, except that such duties as are imposed upon the customs officer or any other person with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property under the customs laws shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under this section by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be authorized or designated for that purpose by the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be. The Attorney General shall have sole responsibility for disposing of petitions for remission or mitigation with respect to property involved in a judicial forfeiture proceeding.

(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, except section 3 of the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, is authorized to retain property forfeited pursuant to this section, or to transfer such property on such terms and conditions as he may determine—

(1) to any other Federal agency;

(2) to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in any of the acts which led to the seizure or forfeiture of the property;

(3) in the case of property referred to in subsection (a)(1)(C), to any Federal financial institution regulatory agency—

(A) to reimburse the agency for payments to claimants or creditors of the institution; and

(B) to reimburse the insurance fund of the agency for losses suffered by the fund as a result of the receivership or liquidation;

(4) in the case of property referred to in subsection (a)(1)(C), upon the order of the appropriate Federal financial institution regulatory agency, to the financial institution as restitution, with the value of the property so transferred to be set off against any amount later recovered by the financial institution as compensatory damages in any State or Federal proceeding;

(5) in the case of property referred to in subsection (a)(1)(C), to any Federal financial institution regulatory agency, to the extent of the agency’s contribution of resources to, or expenses involved in, the seizure and forfeiture, and the investigation leading directly to the seizure and forfeiture, of such property;

(6) as restoration to any victim of the offense giving rise to the forfeiture, including, in the case of a money laundering offense, any offense constituting the underlying specified unlawful activity; or

(7) In [3] the case of property referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D), to the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or any other Federal financial institution regulatory agency (as defined in section 8(e)(7)(D) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act).

The Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, shall ensure the equitable transfer pursuant to paragraph (2) of any forfeited property to the appropriate State or local law enforcement agency so as to reflect generally the contribution of any such agency participating directly in any of the acts which led to the seizure or forfeiture of such property. A decision by the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service pursuant to paragraph (2) shall not be subject to review. The United States shall not be liable in any action arising out of the use of any property the custody of which was transferred pursuant to this section to any non-Federal agency. The Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Postal Service may order the discontinuance of any forfeiture proceedings under this section in favor of the institution of forfeiture proceedings by State or local authorities under an appropriate State or local statute. After the filing of a complaint for forfeiture under this section, the Attorney General may seek dismissal of the complaint in favor of forfeiture proceedings under State or local law. Whenever forfeiture proceedings are discontinued by the United States in favor of State or local proceedings, the United States may transfer custody and possession of the seized property to the appropriate State or local official immediately upon the initiation of the proper actions by such officials. Whenever forfeiture proceedings are discontinued by the United States in favor of State or local proceedings, notice shall be sent to all known interested parties advising them of the discontinuance or dismissal. The United States shall not be liable in any action arising out of the seizure, detention, and transfer of seized property to State or local officials. The United States shall not be liable in any action arising out of a transfer under paragraph (3), (4), or (5) of this subsection.

(f) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.

(g)

(1) Upon the motion of the United States, the court shall stay the civil forfeiture proceeding if the court determines that civil discovery will adversely affect the ability of the Government to conduct a related criminal investigation or the prosecution of a related criminal case.

(2) Upon the motion of a claimant, the court shall stay the civil forfeiture proceeding with respect to that claimant if the court determines that—

(A) the claimant is the subject of a related criminal investigation or case;

(B) the claimant has standing to assert a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding; and

(C) continuation of the forfeiture proceeding will burden the right of the claimant against self-incrimination in the related investigation or case.

(3) With respect to the impact of civil discovery described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may determine that a stay is unnecessary if a protective order limiting discovery would protect the interest of one party without unfairly limiting the ability of the opposing party to pursue the civil case. In no case, however, shall the court impose a protective order as an alternative to a stay if the effect of such protective order would be to allow one party to pursue discovery while the other party is substantially unable to do so.

(4) In this subsection, the terms “related criminal case” and “related criminal investigation” mean an actual prosecution or investigation in progress at the time at which the request for the stay, or any subsequent motion to lift the stay is made. In determining whether a criminal case or investigation is “related” to a civil forfeiture proceeding, the court shall consider the degree of similarity between the parties, witnesses, facts, and circumstances involved in the two proceedings, without requiring an identity with respect to any one or more factors.

(5) In requesting a stay under paragraph (1), the Government may, in appropriate cases, submit evidence ex parte in order to avoid disclosing any matter that may adversely affect an ongoing criminal investigation or pending criminal trial.

(6) Whenever a civil forfeiture proceeding is stayed pursuant to this subsection, the court shall enter any order necessary to preserve the value of the property or to protect the rights of lienholders or other persons with an interest in the property while the stay is in effect.

(7) A determination by the court that the claimant has standing to request a stay pursuant to paragraph (2) shall apply only to this subsection and shall not preclude the Government from objecting to the standing of the claimant by dispositive motion or at the time of trial.

(h) In addition to the venue provided for in section 1395 of title 28 or any other provision of law, in the case of property of a defendant charged with a violation that is the basis for forfeiture of the property under this section, a proceeding for forfeiture under this section may be brought in the judicial district in which the defendant owning such property is found or in the judicial district in which the criminal prosecution is brought.

(i)

(1) Whenever property is civilly or criminally forfeited under this chapter, the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, as the case may be, may transfer the forfeited personal property or the proceeds of the sale of any forfeited personal or real property to any foreign country which participated directly or indirectly in the seizure or forfeiture of the property, if such a transfer—

(A) has been agreed to by the Secretary of State;

(B) is authorized in an international agreement between the United States and the foreign country; and

(C) is made to a country which, if applicable, has been certified under section 481(h) [4] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

A decision by the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to this paragraph shall not be subject to review. The foreign country shall, in the event of a transfer of property or proceeds of sale of property under this subsection, bear all expenses incurred by the United States in the seizure, maintenance, inventory, storage, forfeiture, and disposition of the property, and all transfer costs. The payment of all such expenses, and the transfer of assets pursuant to this paragraph, shall be upon such terms and conditions as the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury may, in his discretion, set.

(2) The provisions of this section shall not be construed as limiting or superseding any other authority of the United States to provide assistance to a foreign country in obtaining property related to a crime committed in the foreign country, including property which is sought as evidence of a crime committed in the foreign country.

(3) A certified order or judgment of forfeiture by a court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country concerning property which is the subject of forfeiture under this section and was determined by such court to be the type of property described in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, and any certified recordings or transcripts of testimony taken in a foreign judicial proceeding concerning such order or judgment of forfeiture, shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding brought pursuant to this section. Such certified order or judgment of forfeiture, when admitted into evidence, shall constitute probable cause that the property forfeited by such order or judgment of forfeiture is subject to forfeiture under this section and creates a rebuttable presumption of the forfeitability of such property under this section.

(4) A certified order or judgment of conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country concerning an unlawful drug activity which gives rise to forfeiture under this section and any certified recordings or transcripts of testimony taken in a foreign judicial proceeding concerning such order or judgment of conviction shall be admissible in evidence in a proceeding brought pursuant to this section. Such certified order or judgment of conviction, when admitted into evidence, creates a rebuttable presumption that the unlawful drug activity giving rise to forfeiture under this section has occurred.

(5) The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection shall not be construed as limiting the admissibility of any evidence otherwise admissible, nor shall they limit the ability of the United States to establish probable cause that property is subject to forfeiture by any evidence otherwise admissible.

(j) For purposes of this section—

(1) the term “Attorney General” means the Attorney General or his delegate; and

(2) the term “Secretary of the Treasury” means the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.

(k) Interbank Accounts.—

(1) In general.—

(A) In general.— For the purpose of a forfeiture under this section or under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), if funds are deposited into an account at a foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title), and that foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) has an interbank account in the United States with a covered financial institution (as defined in section 5318 (j)(1) of title 31), the funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the interbank account in the United States, and any restraining order, seizure warrant, or arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be served on the covered financial institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the funds deposited into the account at the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title), may be restrained, seized, or arrested.

(B) Authority to suspend.— The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, may suspend or terminate a forfeiture under this section if the Attorney General determines that a conflict of law exists between the laws of the jurisdiction in which the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) is located and the laws of the United States with respect to liabilities arising from the restraint, seizure, or arrest of such funds, and that such suspension or termination would be in the interest of justice and would not harm the national interests of the United States.

(2) No requirement for government to trace funds.— If a forfeiture action is brought against funds that are restrained, seized, or arrested under paragraph (1), it shall not be necessary for the Government to establish that the funds are directly traceable to the funds that were deposited into the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title), nor shall it be necessary for the Government to rely on the application of section 984.

(3) Claims brought by owner of the funds.— If a forfeiture action is instituted against funds restrained, seized, or arrested under paragraph (1), the owner of the funds deposited into the account at the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) may contest the forfeiture by filing a claim under section 983.

(4) Definitions.— For purposes of this subsection, the following definitions shall apply:

(A) Interbank account.— The term “interbank account” has the same meaning as in section 984 (c)(2)(B).

(B) Owner.—

(i) In general.— Except as provided in clause (ii), the term “owner”—

(I) means the person who was the owner, as that term is defined in section 983(d)(6), of the funds that were deposited into the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) at the time such funds were deposited; and

(II) does not include either the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) or any financial institution acting as an intermediary in the transfer of the funds into the interbank account.

(ii) Exception.— The foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) may be considered the “owner” of the funds (and no other person shall qualify as the owner of such funds) only if—

(I) the basis for the forfeiture action is wrongdoing committed by the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title); or

(II) the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that prior to the restraint, seizure, or arrest of the funds, the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) had discharged all or part of its obligation to the prior owner of the funds, in which case the foreign financial institution (as defined in section 984 (c)(2)(A) of this title) shall be deemed the owner of the funds to the extent of such discharged obligation.

COUNT VI

Judge _______________ et al , or any other Judicial Officer / Administrative Officer, Attorney / Esquire, Law Enforcement Officer or any other party holding a public office of trust having taken an oath to support and defend the United States Constitution, and the statutes of the United States and of this State and violates or overrules Congressional Enactment or any Judicial Procedure Manual created by Congress or the American Bar Association as Court Procedure and the Rules of Court or overrules any Higher Court decision to deny equal protection under 42 USC 1981 and the 14th amendment with the intent to deny fairness and court integrity by violation of 18 USC 1581 Peonage; obstructing enforcement or means of Obstruction of Justice of the Law and making law from that position by violating 28 USC 454 & 455 and the Bill of Rights of American Citizens by not upholding his/her constitutional Rights which is a felony are guilty of:

TITLE 18 USC > PART I > CHAPTER 93 > § 1918

Sec. 1918. Disloyalty and asserting the right to strike against the
Government

Whoever violates the provision of section 7311 of title 5 that an

individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of

the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if

he -

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of

government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the

overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike,

against the Government of the United States or the government of

the District of Columbia; or

(4) is a member of an organization of employees of the

Government of the United States or of individuals employed by the

government of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the

right to strike against the Government of the United States or

the government of the District of Columbia;

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one

year and a day, or both.

TITLE 5 > PART III > Subpart F > CHAPTER 73 > SUBCHAPTER II

§ 7311. Loyalty and striking

An individual may not accept or hold a position in the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia if he—

(1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(2) is a member of an organization that he knows advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government;

(3) participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United States or the government of the District of Columbia; or

DEMAND FOR ARREST

Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, We the People DEMAND the arrest of the above named felons.

Pursuant to the statutes herein, in particular the Laws of the United States in general, We the People DEMAND that you pursue and prosecute ALL ET AL offenders that have violated their Oath of Office and the Laws of the United States.

DEMAND FOR SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE

Pursuant to the Laws of the United States, We the People DEMAND the seizure and impound of ALL books, records and fraudulent claims made by the fictitious plaintiff, THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA on the account of ALL municipalities, Counties/Townships as evidence of the ongoing felony.

WARNING

Should any person try to cover up the felony complained of herein, BE YOU HEREBY PUT ON NOTICE: You may be indicted under USC Title 18 sections 3, 4, 241, 242, 1918, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384 and 5 USC 7311.

COMPLAINANT, being first truly sworn, states that he has knowledge of the felonies herein complained of: that it is not submitted to be vexatious, but to obtain imperative JUSTICE.

PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL AUTHORITIES

TITLE 31 > SUBTITLE III > CHAPTER 37 > SUBCHAPTER III > § 3729

§ 3729. False claims

(a) Liability for Certain Acts.— Any person who—

(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;

(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid;

(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;

(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;

(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge the property; or

(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government,

is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus 3 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person, except that if the court finds that—

(A) the person committing the violation of this subsection furnished officials of the United States responsible for investigating false claims violations with all information known to such person about the violation within 30 days after the date on which the defendant first obtained the information;

(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government investigation of such violation; and

(C) at the time such person furnished the United States with the information about the violation, no criminal prosecution, civil action, or administrative action had commenced under this title with respect to such violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge of the existence of an investigation into such violation;

the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of the person. A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the United States Government for the costs of a civil action brought to recover any such penalty or damages.

(b) Knowing and Knowingly Defined.— For purposes of this section, the terms “knowing” and “knowingly” mean that a person, with respect to information—

(1) has actual knowledge of the information;

(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or

(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,

and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.

(c) Claim Defined.— For purposes of this section, “claim” includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded.

(d) Exemption From Disclosure.— Any information furnished pursuant to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (a) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.

(e) Exclusion.— This section does not apply to claims, records, or statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > § 1988

§ 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil rights

(a) Applicability of statutory and common law

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.

(b) Attorney’s fees

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92–318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.

In awarding an attorney’s fee under subsection (b) of this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.

TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 21 > SUBCHAPTER I > § 1983

§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, ______________________________the Petitioner comes with this,

[ RECONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE AND NEW INFORMATION ] JUDICIAL NOTICE; NOTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, ALL COURTS ARE OPERATING UNDER THE (1) “TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT” AND, (2) TITLE 28 USC, CHAPTER 176 “FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION PROCEDURE,” MAKING THE COURTS “FOREIGN STATES” TO THE PEOPLE BY CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE, & IN VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL PROCEDURES ATTHED NOTICE OF FELONY being placed before the Clerk of Court of the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF ____________________________________ on this day of ________ and month of______________________ in the year of our Lord 2010 AD..

__________________________

LandRightsNFarming

Sunday, November 7, 2010

11 issues, court document, ready for use by ;Rodney Dale; [Class]

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